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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, nearly half of all United States public companies com-
missioned outside counsel to conduct at least one internal investiga-
tion.
1
  An internal investigation may be triggered by allegations from 
an employee-whistleblower, a threatened shareholders’ derivative ac-
tion, a request for information from the government, a government 
investigation, a media investigation, or a civil complaint.
2
  Whatever 
their source, these allegations present a grave threat to the corpora-
tion.  If valid, they may lead to significant civil liability and criminal 
penalties for the company and its principals. Corporations engage 
counsel to investigate these allegations and rely on counsel’s investig-
ative report in shaping corporate policy, in fashioning a response to 
the allegations,
3
 and in fulfilling their investigation duties under Sar-
banes-Oxley and management’s duty of care.4  In the current wave of 
corporate scandal, calls for internal investigations of alleged wrong-
doing may intensify.
5
 
The internal investigation results reverberate well beyond the 
corporation.  Prosecutors—often without resources to replicate the 
company’s investigative effort—may rely on the report in determin-
ing whether an offense has occurred, what that offense may be, and 
whom to charge with criminal wrongdoing. 
6
  Moreover, company 
 
 1 FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, FIFTH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY FINDINGS 
29 (2008).  In addition, one third of private companies conducted internal investiga-
tions in 2008.  Id at 28; see also Leigh Jones, Call for Internal Probes Growing, NAT’L L.J., 
Nov. 22, 2004, at 1 (reporting that internal-investigation counsel are a “dreaded ne-
cessity” for public companies).   
 2 For an extensive list of investigation triggers, see Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal 
Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 884; see also Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate 
Cooperation During Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7–8 (2007) (cit-
ing reasons for internal corporate investigations). 
 3 See infra Part II.A (discussing reasons for and use of internal investigations).   
 4 See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.   
 5 See generally Paul L. Lee, Risk Management and the Role of the Board of Directors: 
Regulatory Expectations and Shareholder Actions, 125 BANKING L.J. 679 (2008) (noting 
that recent credit crisis will place renewed attention on the role of directors in the 
management of risk and wrongdoing). 
 6 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 664 (2002) (noting “the overwhelming dependence of prosecu-
tors on information and evidence difficult to obtain from complex organizations 
without incentives, and the limited resource of prosecutors’ offices”). 
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cooperation by conducting and releasing the results of an internal in-
vestigation may reduce criminal penalties.
7
  Government agencies 
may use the reports in determining whether to impose penalties and 
other regulatory sanctions.
8
  A court may rely on the results of an in-
vestigation when dismissing a shareholder derivative action against 
the company.
9
  The corporation may publicly release the results, a 
summary of the results, or the report itself as evidence of the absence 
of wrongdoing or of the company’s resolution of the problem.10 
Given the extent to which various constituencies rely on the re-
sults of internal corporate investigations, a fundamental question is 
whether the internal investigation and its report are trustworthy.  
There is reason for concern.  While the American legal system has 
long presumed the clash of adversaries to be the best guarantor of 
truth,
11
 the investigator stands alone, implicitly asking us to accept her 
unilateral efforts as trustworthy.  The investigator, however, is re-
tained and compensated by the corporation that is the subject of the 
allegations, raising troubling questions about loyalty, accountability, 
and conflicting objectives. 
The questions are legion.  Is the internal investigation team un-
der special truth or reliability standards even if the report harms the 
 
 7 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 8 See generally Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Coopera-
tion to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 
2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
investreport/34-44969.htm (utilizing a company’s audit committee report for assis-
tance in making a determination). 
 9 See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 519–20 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
 10 For example, investigative counsel’s internal investigation of management’s 
conduct in developing and marketing the drug Vioxx, which largely exonerated 
Merck management, was posted on the Web sites of both the law firm and Merck, 
and the report’s release was announced in press conferences.  In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. 
Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2007) (granting 
protective order in underlying investigation materials).  For an example of the wide-
spread news accounts of the investigative report, see Alex Berenson, Merck Inquiry 
Backs Conduct over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at C1; John Markoff & Eric Dash, 
Apple Panel on Options Backs Chief,  N.Y. TIMES, December 30, 2006, at C1.   
 11 E.g., Scontsas v. Citizens Ins. Co., 253 A.2d 831, 833 (N.H. 1969) (“It is the phi-
losophy of the adversary system that the truth will more likely be reached if both 
sides of the issue are fully presented and that this is more likely to occur if the sides 
are presented by partisan advocates.”).  Professor Wigmore famously termed a cen-
tral element of the adversarial system, cross examination, “the greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth.”  JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW 32 (James H. Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1974) (1940).  
For a comparison of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to justice, see ALVIN I. 
GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD § 9.4 (1999). 
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client who undertakes and pays for the investigation?  If so, what are 
these standards?  Are all internal investigations subject to these stan-
dards, including investigations that are intended to further a repre-
sentation?  If and when special truth standards do attach, how can the 
attorney’s duty to a third party be reconciled with the duties that an 
attorney owes his client?  Do tensions or counter-incentives that in-
here in the nature or structure of the investigative process undermine 
the search for truth?  Conversely, are certain structures more likely to 
enhance reliability?  Can the recipient of an investigative report rely 
on its conclusions when professionals regularly disagree on matters of 
interpretation? 
Despite the considerable literature on internal investigations, 
commentators and courts have not developed a conceptual under-
standing of these issues.
12
  This inattention can be traced to a variety 
of causes.  First, in routine transactions and litigation matters, attor-
neys regularly investigate client facts and information and disclose 
such information to third parties either directly or in the form of 
opinion letters.  Thus, it is not immediately evident which investiga-
tions should be subject to special truth standards.  Second, because 
some statutes require corporations to conduct an independent inves-
tigation when certain triggers arise,
13
 practitioners may assume that 
only investigations conducted pursuant to a such a mandate are sub-
 
 12 For example, the leading treatise on the subject discusses the importance of 
independence in an investigation without exploring the more fundamental questions 
about the truth commitment of an investigation.  Michael J. Shepard & Robert B. 
Buehler, No Security: Internal Investigations into Violations of the Securities Laws, in 
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 353, 386–89 (Barry F. McNeil & Brad D. Brian 
eds., 3rd ed. 2007).  Much of the commentary in this treatise and elsewhere has been 
directed to when and whether to conduct an internal investigation, how to deal with 
employee and other witnesses, privilege, and work-product protections, and how and 
whether to report the results.  Id.  See generally Robert S. Bennett et al., Internal Inves-
tigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 BUS. LAW. 55 (2006) 
(offering a useful summary of investigation issues).  These are critical questions, but 
they are best considered in light of the truth commitment that the investigative role 
entails.  Practitioner treatments of the reliability question have offered helpful ana-
lyses of court decisions but have not sought to develop a principled account of the 
basis or significance of the reliability standards or their universality.  E.g., Jeffrey M. 
Kaplan et al., Internal Corporate Investigations in the Post-Enron Era: A Guide to Indepen-
dence Requirements, in 2 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2003 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. B-1366, 2003).  An early practitioner effort to identify 
some of the reliability questions posed by internal investigations is Arthur F. Ma-
thews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1984).  An early scholarly 
treatment is Samuel H. Gruenbaum & Martin A. Oppenheimer, Special Investigative 
Counsel: Conflicts and Roles, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 865 (1981).   
 13 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 authorizes independent investi-
gations in certain instances but does not define the term with any precision. Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, § 301(5), 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002).  See discussion infra notes 61–66. 
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ject to reliability standards.
14
  They also assume that the standards re-
ferenced by such statutes or court opinions are the only standards 
that an investigation need satisfy.  Third, if there are obligations 
beyond these statutory or investigation-specific requirements, it is not 
clear what they are and from what sources of law they derive.
15
  
Fourth, because there is so much discretion involved in the investiga-
tion, truth obligations might be perceived as quixotic.  Fifth, because 
practitioners know that an investigation must be credible if it is to be 
of value to the party that receives the results, it is a short step to the 
assumption that the principal trustworthiness constraint on an inves-
tigation is one of perception rather than obligation.  Finally, some 
may assume that any constraints on the reliability of the investigation 
can be solved by disclosure and disclaimers to the recipient of the re-
port, an assumption that may not withstand scrutiny. 
Given the number of investigations that corporations conduct 
each year and the weight that company directors, prosecutors, regula-
tory authorities, the courts, the public, and the media afford the re-
sults, it is time for a systematic inquiry into the nature and extent of 
the truth commitment of investigative counsel.  This Article will seek 
to develop a principled account of when investigative counsel are sub-
ject to special truth obligations, what those obligations are, how they 
can be understood in a client setting, and what they entail for the 
structure and conduct of an internal corporate investigation and for 
disclosure of the results.
16
 
Part II of this Article examines the threshold questions.  It de-
velops a taxonomy of investigations based on their varying rationales 
that will allow us to identify which investigations should be subject to 
special truth standards.  In particular, Part II identifies two investiga-
tion types that pose special concerns and warrant imposition of truth 
standards: (1) reliance investigations, which are investigations that 
will be shared with third parties including the government, the 
courts, and the public, and (2) duty investigations, which are investi-
gations in furtherance of a legal duty of inquiry.  Part II will explain 
why these two investigation types pose special truth concerns under, 
respectively, the attorney-ethics rules that govern the practice of law 
in nearly every American jurisdiction and the special corporation law 
 
 14 For a discussion of the variety of reasons to conduct an internal investigation, 
only some of which are statutory, see infra Part II.A.   
 15 For a discussion of these sources, see infra Part II.A.3.   
 16 Although our emphasis here is on the role of the internal investigator, we will 
examine the corporation’s truth obligations to the extent they shape the investiga-
tor’s truth commitment.    
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and statutory-investigation duties that require inquiry when allega-
tions of wrongdoing arise.  Part II will conclude with a discussion of 
why corporations may insist on satisfaction of the truth standards in 
other internal investigations conducted in response to allegations of 
wrongdoing. 
Part III will address this Article’s core objective, the identifica-
tion and analysis of the truth standards that must be satisfied in a re-
liance or duty investigation.  The Article will contend that an accurate 
account must be the substantive goal of any reliance or duty investiga-
tion.  This notion raises fundamental questions about the objectivity 
of law and whether there can be a “correct” or “accurate account” in 
an internal investigation.  To explore these questions, Part III will 
look to philosophy, jurisprudence, and historiography—all discip-
lines that have struggled with basic questions about whether subjectiv-
ity irretrievably clouds our search for truth.  Insights from these dis-
ciplines will help refine our understanding of accuracy in the 
investigation setting and explain why an array of other truth stan-
dards follows from a commitment to accuracy.
17
  Part III will explain 
why four truth standards—independence, sufficient inquiry, eviden-
tiary reliability, and professional judgment—must be satisfied in or-
der to provide an accurate account in a reliance or duty investigation.  
Part III will also examine the degree of certainty an investigator 
should claim for her conclusions, why a listing of disclaimers is insuf-
ficient counterpoise to an investigator’s conclusions, why a detailed 
analysis should accompany the investigator’s conclusions, and how 
the truth standards can refine our understanding of an investigator’s 
tort duties. 
Part IV will apply the truth standards to selected aspects of the 
three main phases of an internal investigation: retention, the investi-
gation itself, and the reporting.  The standards will lead us to ques-
tion certain client commitments undertaken by investigative counsel 
that can undermine the investigation role. 
 
 17 The fusion of the theoretical and practical in this Article owes much to two 
contributions on the calling and methodology of legal scholarship.  The first is Judge 
Harry T. Edwards’s seminal plea for prescriptive legal scholarship that “analyzes the 
law and the legal system with an aim to instruct attorneys in their consideration of 
legal problems; to guide judges and other decision-makers in their resolution of legal 
disputes.”  Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 42–43 (1992). The second is Jean Braucher’s 
contention, presented in connection with her review of Jay Feinman’s excellent trea-
tise on economic negligence, that the analysis of the problems confronting lawyers 
and judges is stronger and more sophisticated when it is grounded in legal theory.  
Jean Braucher, Economic Negligence: Liability of Professionals and Businesses to Third Par-
ties for Economic Loss, 51 BUS. LAW. 795, 799 (1996).   
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Part V will conclude by revisiting the questions raised in this in-
troduction and by offering some general considerations about the 
principles developed herein and their value for corporations, inves-
tigative counsel, and recipients of investigative reports. 
II. WHICH INVESTIGATIONS? 
In this Part, the goal is to identify which internal investigations 
warrant the imposition of special truth standards.  To shed light on 
that question, this Article will first develop a taxonomy of investiga-
tion types based on how the investigation information will be used.  
This taxonomy should help analyze which of these investigation roles 
(if any) requires special attention from a truth or reliability perspec-
tive. 
A Taxonomy 
1. The Counseling Investigation 
Attorneys conduct investigations of corporate clients for a variety 
of reasons.  Not all of these investigations pose truth and reliability 
concerns that warrant the imposition of special standards.  For exam-
ple, attorneys routinely investigate the client in order to learn infor-
mation that will advance a litigation or counseling objective for the 
corporation.  This first category, which we will term a counseling in-
vestigation, is marked by the consonance of interest between attorney 
and client.  The investigation is not undertaken to fulfill a corporate 
management duty to investigate and is often used to assist counsel in 
advising the client.
18
  When information learned in a counseling in-
vestigation is disclosed to third parties—for example, in litigation dis-
covery or in the course of a negotiation—it does not purport to be 
backed by counsel’s investigation.  As a result, the counseling investi-
gation does not implicate truth concerns that differ from any stan-
dard representation.  The attorney-ethics rules and standard of care 
that govern every representation provide adequate protection to 
 
 18 The counseling investigation is often conducted with an eye toward preserving 
attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product protections in the investigation 
results and underlying materials. For the privilege protections to attach, the commu-
nications with counsel must, inter alia, have been to obtain legal advice.  Upjohn Co. 
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–96 (1981) (upholding privilege and work-product 
protections in internal investigation into allegations that company employees en-
gaged in bribery).  The seminal definition of “work product” in Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) is refined and codified in FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B), which, 
absent substantial need, protects the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories of a party’s attorney . . . concerning the litigation.”   
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third party and client, respectively, in this setting.
19
  The attorney 
must also report candidly and with independent professional judg-
ment to his client.
20
 
2. The Due Diligence Investigation 
A second category of investigation, which we will call a due dili-
gence investigation, is typically conducted by counsel to ground her 
representations to a third party.
21
  The archetypal example is the in-
vestigation undertaken to support a representation set forth in an 
opinion letter that counsel delivers to a third party in connection 
with a transaction.
22
  For example, in a business transaction, an attor-
ney may be asked to opine on the good standing of the client,
23
 the 
validity of the transaction, 
24
 whether the security provided is valid,
25
 
or whether the transaction is subject to a tax exemption.
26
 
The due diligence investigation poses fewer truth and reliability 
risks than the reliance and duty investigations considered in Part 
 
 19 As in every representation, the attorney must not, for example, make a know-
ing misstatement of material fact to a third party, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 4.1 (2007), and must perform in accordance with the duty of care, RONALD E. 
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.2 (2007 ed.).   
 20 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1.   
 21 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982), 
reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 471, 472 (1982) (discussing ethical obligations for opinion 
letters relating to tax shelters). 
 22 Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path, & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice 
Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 62 (2005) 
(noting that third-party closing opinions are a “fixture of the American legal 
scene[]”) (citing DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL 
OPINIONS IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 2001)).  Additionally, there are 
hundreds of third party legal opinions being delivered each week.  Id. (quoting 
Comm. on Legal Opinions, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Law Office Opinion Practices, 60 
BUS. LAW. 327 (2004)). 
 23 E.g., Zimmerman v. Dan Kamphausen Co., 971 P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. App. 
1998) (involving a law firm opinion letter stating that a partnership was properly 
constituted and had the legal power to execute a guaranty and perform its obliga-
tions thereunder, and that the signatory was authorized to sign a guaranty on behalf 
of the partnership). 
 24 E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 
605 N.E.2d 318, 323 (N.Y. 1992) (involving  an opinion letter offering assurances to 
the creditor about the borrower’s business, that the loan documents were valid, 
properly authorized and enforceable, and that the terms did not violate an obliga-
tion of the borrower). 
 25 E.g., Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Jackson, Brouillette, Pohl & Kirley, P.C., 
912 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Mo. App. 1995) (“[s]ecurity documents constituted valid, bind-
ing and enforceable obligations”).  
 26 E.g., Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (involving opinion letter 
counsel issued to investors concerning tax-exempt status of bonds).     
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II.A.3.  The representations in transaction opinions are precise, nar-
rowly formulated facts or legal conclusions, designed to satisfy certain 
conditions precedent to a transaction.  The comparatively focused 
and verifiable representations in an opinion letter render viable re-
covery for negligent misstatements.
27
  Moreover, the risks of a conflict 
between attorney and client are comparatively modest in the opinion 
setting because counsel and client have opportunities to cure defi-
ciencies before the opinion is issued. 
3. The Reliance and Duty Investigations 
Our third category, which consists of what we will call reliance 
and duty investigations, warrants the imposition of special truth and 
reliability standards.  The internal corporate investigation considered 
here is typically triggered by allegations of corporate wrongdoing.  
While commentators often describe this trigger, they have not consi-
dered why the investigation in response to an allegation of wrong-
doing often warrants imposition of special standards regarding the 
truth and reliability of the investigation.
28
  First, corporations often 
have reason to share the findings of an internal investigation into al-
legations of wrongdoing—both incriminating and exculpatory—with 
third parties.  Second, allegations of wrongdoing often implicate a 
company’s legal duty to learn the truth of the allegation.  We will 
consider each of these instances next. 
a. Third-Party Reliance 
The corporation may choose to share internal investigation re-
sults with the government, the public, and the courts, and thereby in-
vite them to rely on the results.  The client and the third-party reci-
pient both have a substantial interest in the outcome of the internal 
investigation, which is typically an inquiry into whether the corpora-
tion or its agents have committed wrongdoing.  The potential for 
conflict between the client and the third party presents such a grave 
risk to the integrity of the investigation that it is addressed by the at-
torney-ethics rules, although few commentators and practitioners 
have looked to the attorney-ethics rules in analyzing the responsibili-
ties of counsel in an internal investigation.
29
 
 
 27 See, e.g.,  Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 481 (3d Cir. 1994); In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 751–52, 769 (S.D. 
Tex. 2005).   
 28 See, e.g., Duggin, supra note 2.   
 29 For example, the leading volume on internal investigations makes no mention 
of the attorney-ethics rules generally, or MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3 spe-
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
30
 adopted with variations 
in nearly every state,
31
 impose a comprehensive set of obligations on 
attorneys.
32
  Model Rule 2.3, entitled “Evaluation for Use by Third 
Persons,” allows an attorney with client consent to conduct an “evalu-
ation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than 
the client.”33  Under the Rule, a lawyer may conduct an evaluation if 
“the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compat-
ible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.”34  
Part III will consider the significance of this Rule in developing truth 
standards that control an internal investigation.  The threshold con-
cern, however, is which investigative efforts are controlled by the 
Rule. 
Model Rule 2.3(a) can be parsed into three elements.
35
  First, the 
attorney must undertake an “evaluation.”36  Second, the evaluation 
must concern “a matter affecting the client.”37  Third, the evaluation 
 
cifically.  INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12.  Even the penetrating 
analysis of the Enron investigation and the conflicts faced by investigative counsel 
offered by Professor Cramton makes no reference to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 2.3(a).  See generally Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A 
Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143 (2002). 
 30 The ABA first promulgated the Model Rules in 1983, and they have been 
amended frequently since, including substantial revisions in 2002, based on the rec-
ommendations of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, chaired by Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, Chair’s Introduction (2007). 
 31 Forty-nine states have adopted some version of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, often with amendments.  See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT § 1:3 (2009) (listing ethics rules adopted in each state) [hereinafter 
LAWYERS’ MANUAL].  In 2009, New York and Maine adopted the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, superseding the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Id.; ME. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl. (2009).  California is considering adoption of the Model Rules.  
Comm’n for the Revision of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, The State Bar of Cal., 
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10129&id=1100 (last vi-
sited Feb. 25, 2010).        
 32 In re Greenberg, 714 A.2d 243, 250 (N.J. 1998) (noting that ethics rules 
provide “a road map for the conduct of attorneys to guide them in their relationships 
with their clients, other attorneys, the courts, and the public”); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope, at [19] (“Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibi-
tion imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”); LAWYERS’ 
MANUAL, supra note 31 at § 01:101-195; John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Profes-
sional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 118 (1995) (“Not only do these rules re-
flect a broad consensus among courts and bar committees about how lawyers should 
behave, they also constitute law that lawyers must obey.”).    
 33 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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must be for “the use of someone other than the client.”38  An internal 
investigation is intended to assess some aspect of the client’s affairs, 
and thus it undoubtedly qualifies as an “evaluation” under the first 
element of Model Rule 2.3(a).
39
 
The second element of the Rule seeks to distinguish investiga-
tions for the client’s own use from investigations for third parties.40  
As the comments note, the rule applies to attorneys who are retained 
by the client “whose affairs are being examined.”41  For example, 
analysis of the property title of the seller for a client buyer would not 
be within the scope of the rule.
42
  Nevertheless, this second element 
of the rule is satisfied by the internal corporate investigation because 
the corporation retains the investigator to examine and report to a 
third party on an allegation of wrongdoing by the corporation.  The 
corporation is, as the Rule contemplates, both the subject of the in-
vestigation and the client of the investigating attorney. 
The third element of Model Rule 2.3(a) looks to the purpose of 
the evaluative effort.
43
  The Rule applies only to evaluations for “the 
use of someone other than the client.”44  An understanding of this 
element requires fusion of the evaluation and use elements. The 
element is not satisfied simply by disclosure to a third party of infor-
mation that is learned in an internal investigation.  Rather, the inves-
tigator must represent or imply that the information disclosed is 
based on an “evaluation,” which as noted above includes an internal 
investigation.
45
  The disclosure of information to a third party without 
any claims about its provenance does not implicate Model Rule 2.3.  
Thus, a corporation that conducts an internal investigation, but wish-
es to share only selected results with a third party, is not bound by the 
strictures of Model Rule 2.3 if it does not claim or imply that the in-
formation disclosed is the result of an internal investigation.  Model 
Rule 2.3 is triggered, however, when the information disclosed, even 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 This reading is affirmed by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 95 cmt. a (2000), which closely tracks Model Rule 2.3, and notes that in-
ternal corporate investigations are subject to the Rule.   
 40 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a). 
 41 Id. at cmt. 2.  
 42 Id.   
 43 See id. at R. 2.3(a). 
 44 Id. at cmt. 2. 
 45 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.   
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if only a summary, is expressly or impliedly represented as being 
based on an internal investigation.
46
 
To ground our inquiry into the reach of Model Rule 2.3, sup-
pose that a corporation commissions a law firm to conduct an inter-
nal investigation in response to an accusation of company wrong-
doing.  If the report exonerates the company, the company will likely 
hasten to dispel the perception of wrongdoing to the shareholders 
and the public.  Instead of simply declaring its innocence, the com-
pany will announce the findings of the internal investigation con-
ducted by investigative counsel.
47
  The corporation’s release of inves-
tigative findings to the public would trigger Model Rule 2.3 because 
the information is portrayed as investigative findings to the public, 
which will “use” the findings.48 
If, in our example, the internal investigation found wrongdoing, 
the company still has ample incentive to disclose it to government au-
thorities in furtherance of statutory and regulatory provisions that 
encourage or reward self-investigation and reporting of wrongdoing.  
For example, under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a company that 
self-reports wrongdoing before a government investigation is com-
menced receives a five-point reduction in the sentencing calcula-
tion.
49
  The SEC likewise reduces penalties for companies that con-
duct a thorough investigation and report the results to the 
Commission and the public.
50
  Other government agencies encourage 
 
 46 For a discussion of truth standards and report summaries, see infra Parts III.F 
and IV.C.  In addition, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) bans counsel from 
knowingly making false statements to a third party.   
 47 The reputation of a company ranks among its most valuable assets and a com-
pany therefore has considerable incentive to release investigation results to quell or 
at least manage public concern. See In re Kidder, Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 
466 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (internal investigation conducted because “Kidder’s unique pub-
lic profile and its vulnerability to the ebb and flow of market opinion and the preda-
tions of its competitors made it urgent that the internal investigation be well publi-
cized and viewed as the inquiry of an ‘independent’ and incorruptible outsider”); 
supra note 10. 
 48 Even though the public may not take legal action based on the contents of the 
report, their receipt should best be understood as a “use” within the reach of MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3 because the disclosure is intended to shape percep-
tion of the company’s behavior.  
 49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g)(1) (2008).  Of course, the 
disclosure is not without risk.  “[A]lthough the disclosure might benefit the compa-
ny’s position in settlement negotiations with the government, it can also provide the 
government with a ‘roadmap’ to proceed with an action if it decides to do so, and 
will certainly supply ammunition to third-party private litigants.”  Alexandra A.E. 
Shapiro, Ethics and Best Practices in Internal Investigations, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
2007 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Series No. B-1366, 2007). 
 50 Seaboard Report, supra note 8.  
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and reward the corporation’s self-reporting of wrongdoing.51  Model 
Rule 2.3 would apply in each of these instances if the company disclo-
sure is represented to be findings of an internal investigation.  Com-
panies have strong incentive to share all of the investigation results, 
rather than selected information without reference to its provenance, 
to gain additional credit for cooperation and thereby reduce penal-
ties.
52
 
In practice, these incentives to disclose information to the gov-
ernment as investigation results are even greater than the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines and department and agency policies suggest on 
their face.  Constrained by limited budgets and resources, prosecu-
tors and regulatory agencies have additional reason to rely on the re-
sults of internal corporate investigations in determining whether to 
pursue criminal or regulatory sanctions against the corporation and 
its employees.
53
 
 
 51 Corporations and individuals reporting their involvement in antitrust viola-
tions may receive immunity from the DOJ’s Antitrust Division under its leniency pro-
gram, insulating successful applicants from criminal fines and imprisonment.  See 
Dep’t of Justice (Antitrust Division) Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10, 1993), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf.  The Environ-
mental Protection Agency is less likely to pursue criminal enforcement against com-
panies that self-report.  See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correc-
tion and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed Reg. 66,706, 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995). 
Defense contractors that self-report misconduct may avoid debarment and reduce 
prospects for criminal prosecution.  See generally INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF DEF., 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM: A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS (Apr. 23, 1990), 
available at http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/vdguidelines.pdf.  The 
New York Stock Exchange rewards cooperation by reducing sanctions, charges or not 
pursuing criminal prosecution.  See NYSE, Inc., Information Memorandum No. 05-65 
(Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.nsf/ 
AllPublishedInfoMemosNyseCom/85256FCB005E19E88525707C004C6DE0/ 
$FILE/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Document%20in%2005-65.pdf. 
 52 See Seaboard Report, supra note 8 (citing as factor in determining extent 
whether “the company produce[d] a thorough and probing written report detailing 
the findings of its review”).  “Timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing” is also 
considered by federal prosecutors in deciding whether to bring criminal charges 
against a corporation.  Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, 
to Heads of Departmental Components, U.S. Attorneys 4 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNul-
ty Memorandum]. Although waiver of the attorney-client privilege is not a condition 
of cooperation, “the disclosure of privileged information may be critical in enabling 
the government to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the company’s volun-
tary disclosure.”  Id. at 8.   
 53 See William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of Attorney Client Privilege in the Corpo-
rate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 639 n.69 (2006) (arguing that govern-
ment effectively outsources investigation costs to the corporation, which fears graver 
sanctions if misconduct is discovered and the company had not investigated); cf. Lau-
fer, supra note 7, at 646 (noting that with limited government resources and other 
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Corporations may also deliver investigative reports to the court 
in response to notice of a shareholder derivative claim filed against 
the corporation or in support of a motion to dismiss such a lawsuit.
54
  
When a corporation receives a demand to initiate a derivative action, 
the board’s decision to decline such a demand will be afforded con-
siderable deference absent evidence that the board acted without due 
care, in bad faith, or in self-interest.
55
  Even when the shareholder 
makes no demand on the corporation prior to filing the derivative ac-
tion, Delaware law permits the corporation to move to dismiss the ac-
tion based in part on a good-faith internal investigation conducted at 
the direction of an independent committee of the board.
56
  A reliable 
internal investigation is an important element in defending the 
board’s decision not to institute such a claim or to dismiss a claim 
once brought, although the court’s assessment of the investigation’s 
reliability in the shareholder-derivative setting is typically more ad 
hoc than systematic.
57
  Although courts have not cited Rule 2.3(a) in 
the shareholder-derivative setting, the Rule applies to investigative 
reports delivered to courts because they too are “third parties” under 
the Rule. 
Rule 2.3 applies to both attorney opinion letters, which are con-
ducted in furtherance of a due diligence investigation, and to the re-
liance investigation because both result in reports delivered to third 
parties.
58
  Truth and reliability concerns, however, are far greater in 
the reliance investigation for several reasons.  First, as noted above, 
the reliance investigation is typically triggered by allegations of com-
pany wrongdoing,
59
 an issue about which the corporation and the 
 
enforcement burdens, “it is little wonder that the government often exchanges le-
niency for conciliatory post-offense behavior”)     
 54 In a shareholder derivative claim, a shareholder brings an action on behalf of 
the corporation against a third party, often the corporation’s management, when the 
corporation has refused or failed to do so.  The shareholder must typically first make 
a demand on the corporation to bring the action, because “it is the company’s cause 
of action.”  Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 244.   
 55 See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 
1989).   
 56 See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1984).   
 57 See, e.g., Halpert Enters., Inc. v. Harrison, No. 06-Civ-2331(HB), 2007 WL 
486561, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2007) (dismissing action and citing five-month in-
ternal investigation by an independent law firm, with dozens of interviews, extensive 
document review, and a lengthy report).   
 58 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. a (2000).  
Rule 2.3 applies to attorney opinion letters as well.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (2007).  
 59 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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third party have a substantial and often conflicting interest.  Second, 
investigative findings and analysis are not akin to the precise, verifia-
ble representations offered in an opinion letter, but instead require 
the exercise of judgment and discretion with respect to the nature 
and extent of the investigation, evaluations of credibility, and inter-
pretation and application of legal standards to a complicated matrix 
of facts.  Thus, opinion letters are subject to checks and balances that 
are impracticable in the internal investigation context, including lia-
bility for misstatements.  Third, the internal investigation is a histori-
cal exercise; wrongdoing discovered in an internal investigation can-
not be “cured” by investigative counsel prior to issuance of a report, 
and the disclosure of wrongdoing contained in the report may result 
in severe sanctions for the corporation. 
Thus, at least one class of investigations, reliance investigations, 
poses special truth concerns not implicated by the representation or 
due diligence investigation.  The concern is so great, in fact, that 
Rule 2.3 allows counsel to perform such an investigation only if her 
investigative role is reasonably compatible with the investigator’s 
client role.
60
  Part III will consider what this standard signifies for the 
truth commitment of investigative counsel. 
b. A Duty to Inquire 
The second category of internal investigations that poses special 
concerns about truth and reliability is that which is conducted in fur-
therance of the legal requirement of the corporation to inquire or 
keep informed (“duty investigation”).  For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) requires publicly traded com-
panies to undertake an inquiry in certain circumstances.
61
  If an at-
torney discovers evidence of the company’s “material violation of se-
curities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation,” the 
lawyer must report it to the company’s chief legal officer or both the 
chief legal officer and the chief executive officer.
62
  “The chief legal 
officer . . . shall cause such inquiry into the evidence of a material vi-
olation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate to determine 
whether the material violation described in the report has occurred, 
 
 60 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a). 
 61 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–76 
(2002). 
 62 Id. § 307 (requiring attorney to report to the board of directors or other com-
mittee in the absence of an “appropriate response”); see also 17 C.F.R. §205.2(e) 
(2009) (describing nature of knowledge that constitutes evidence of material viola-
tion). 
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is ongoing, or is about to occur” and cause the company to “adopt an 
appropriate response.”63 
Thus, when the chief legal officer is confronted with information 
suggesting particular types of wrongdoing, Sarbanes-Oxley requires a 
reasonable inquiry into the alleged wrongdoing.
64
  When the chief le-
gal officer retains counsel to fulfill that obligation, counsel’s investi-
gation and report must be reliable if it is to satisfy the corporation’s 
reasonable-investigation requirement.  In addition, investigations un-
der Sarbanes-Oxley are often conducted by the audit committee of 
the board of directors in furtherance of its longstanding role in mon-
itoring compliance issues; these roles have been enhanced under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.
65
  The Act also provides that the audit committee of 
publicly traded companies “shall have the authority to engage inde-
pendent counsel and other advisors, as it determines necessary to 
carry out its duties.”66  With its emphasis on reasonable and indepen-
 
 63 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2009).  If the attorney does not believe that the re-
sponse is appropriate, the attorney must then report the material violation to the au-
dit committee of the board of directors or to a committee of independent directors 
or to the entire board of directors. Id. § 205.3(b)(3)(i).  Alternatively, the attorney 
can report such concerns to a qualified legal compliance committee, assuming the 
corporation had already established such committee.    Id. § 205.3(b)(2).  After such 
reporting, the attorney need not evaluate the response or report further.    Id. § 
205.3(b)(8).  See generally William H. Volz & Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under 
Sarbanes–Oxley: The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitator of Corporate Integri-
ty, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 439 (2006).   
 64 See Shepard & Buehler, supra note 12, at 372 (“[I]t would be hard for any reci-
pient to formulate an ‘appropriate response’ without learning the facts through an 
investigation of some kind.”) 
 65 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301(m)(4), 116 Stat. 
745, 776 (2002); Bennett et al., supra note 12, at 61 (audit committee control of Sar-
banes-Oxley investigations is now “de rigueur”).   
 66 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; see also Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the European Corporate Governance Summit: An 
SEC Commissioner’s View: The Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers 
(Mar. 2, 2005),  http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030205cag.htm (encourag-
ing that investigations that are independent “in definition as well as spirit”).  The 
stock exchanges have adopted similar investigative rules.  See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rule 
342.21 (2007) (requiring corporation to conduct internal investigation into any 
trade that appears to have violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the rules 
promulgated thereunder, and the “rules of the Exchange prohibiting insider trading 
and manipulative and deceptive devices”).  Internal investigations may also be trig-
gered by an auditor’s discovery of company wrongdoing.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j–
l(b)(1)(B) (2006).  Under Section 10A of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, an auditor who discovers “information “indicating that an illegal act” has 
occurred must inform management and the audit committee.  Id.  If the company 
does not undertake “appropriate remedial actions,” which often includes an internal 
investigation, the auditor must report to the board of directors, which must imme-
diately inform the SEC.  Id. 
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dent inquiry, Sarbanes-Oxley has more than evinced a concern about 
reliability in internal investigations conducted under its provisions. 
Another source of a duty to investigate can be implied from the 
duty of care imposed by corporate law.  The duty of care requires di-
rectors to keep reasonably informed and to implement systems to 
monitor legal compliance.
67
  When an allegation of wrongdoing is 
lodged against the corporation or its agents, management may en-
gage counsel to investigate the facts and analyze their legal signific-
ance in order to gain information sufficient to fulfill its duty of care. 
68
  
Again, the insistence on a reasonable inquiry suggests that an internal 
investigation intended to satisfy the duty of care must be sensitive to 
concerns about reliability.
69
  Moreover, the attorney-ethics rules re-
quire the attorney to advise his client with candor and independent 
professional judgment,
70
 a standard that reinforces the obligations of 
counsel to develop a reliable investigative account for the client. 
Some investigations may implicate both duty and reliance con-
cerns.  For example, corporations might commission internal investi-
gations to fulfill a duty to investigate charges of employment-related 
wrongdoing, including allegations of sexual harassment.  “When de-
 
 67 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(noting that failure to investigate charges may lead to allegation that corporation 
recklessly ignored the concern); Duggin, supra note 2, at 882 (noting that case estab-
lishes liability of directors “for failing to monitor their organization’s compliance 
with legal obligations”).   
 68 See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a)(1) (2008) (noting that the duty of care “includes the 
obligation to make, or cause to be made, an inquiry when, but only when, the cir-
cumstances would alert a reasonable director or officer to the need therefor”). 
 69 Some statutes or rules require the reporting of information but do not require 
that the corporation conduct an inquiry or investigation.  See, e.g., Anti-Kickback En-
forcement Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. § 57 (2006) (requiring a written report by govern-
ment contractors if they have reason to believe a kickback has been given between 
contracting parties); Medicare Fraud Reporting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) 
(2006) (imposing criminal penalties for concealing or failing to disclose an “event 
with an intent fraudulently to secure such benefit or payment either in a greater 
amount or quantity than is due or when no such benefit or payment is authorized”); 
NYSE, Inc., Rule 351(a)(1) (2007) (requiring disclosure of certain employee discip-
linary matters).  These statutes and rules arguably do not justify imposition of the 
truth standards developed in Part III on an investigation, even one that is conducted 
to determine whether there is information that must be reported under the statute.  
Instead, these are better understood as furthering an enforcement objective, such as 
the disclosure of information that is known to the corporation absent some evidence 
that a particular statute was designed to mandate monitoring or procedures to en-
sure discovery of the information.  As this Article will discuss infra Part II.B, however, 
even when the truth standards are not mandated, companies would nonetheless do 
well to insist that investigative counsel satisfy them.   
 70 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1. (2007). 
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termining the adequacy and effectiveness of an employer’s response 
to a hostile environment claim, courts have considered ‘whether the 
employer investigated the alleged acts of harassment and the type of 
investigation the employer conducted.’”71  Courts will inquire into the rea-
sonableness and sufficiency of an internal investigation in determin-
ing whether it is a sufficient employer response to defeat employer 
liability.
72
  Whether viewed as a duty or reliance investigation, it is 
clear that the reliability of the internal investigation remains a critical 
concern. 
B. Additional Reasons to Satisfy the Truth Standards 
The taxonomy of investigation types has allowed us to identify 
with some precision the types of investigations—reliance and duty in-
vestigations—that warrant the imposition of truth standards.  Part III 
will develop the truth standards that must be satisfied by such investi-
gations.  Before turning to this question, we should consider the 
practical and prudential reasons why corporations should comply 
with the truth standards even when not required to do so. 
First, corporations may conduct an internal investigation without 
determining in advance how they will use the results.  Because an in-
vestigation that does not satisfy the truth standards may not satisfy the 
client’s duty of inquiry or be worthy of reliance by a third party,73 a 
corporation can best preserve the option of such disclosure or re-
liance by conducting an investigation in accordance with the truth 
standards from the outset.  The internal investigation is a substantial 
undertaking,
74
 and to maximize its use and value, the corporation has 
an overwhelming incentive to insist on compliance with the truth 
standards in any investigation triggered by an allegation of wrong-
doing.
75
  Second, an accurate and trustworthy account will uncover 
 
 71 Harding v. Dana Transp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1084, 1094 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting 
Giordano v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 804 F. Supp. 637, 643 (D.N.J. 1992)). 
 72 See id. at 1096; see also Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 327 (N.J. 1997) 
(holding that corporations can avoid liability for failure to take remedial measures 
upon learning of alleged harassment by, for example, undertaking a vigorous in-
quiry).   
 73 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 74 The law firm Debevoise & Plimpton conducted the internal investigation con-
cerning whether senior management at Merck failed to disclose the risks of Vioxx.  
Berenson, supra note 10.  The investigation extended over 20 months, consumed 
53,000 hours, and cost $21 million.  Id.  The report consisted of 180 pages, with twen-
ty appendices of another 1500 pages, and was based on interviews with more than 
150 witnesses.  Id. 
 75 Thus, even if the investigation is conducted as a counseling investigation with 
hopes of preserving the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product, see supra 
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problems that can be resolved earlier and increase the prospects that 
the cancer of wrongful behavior can be excised before it metastasizes 
to a corporate division or beyond.  A well-managed company that 
receives a credible allegation of material wrongdoing thus has ample 
reason not only to inquire but to insist that the inquiry satisfy the 
truth standards that Part III will develop. 
III. INVESTIGATIONS AND THE TRUTH 
Now that we have established what types of investigations pose 
special concerns about truth or reliability—the reliance and duty in-
vestigations—our next task is to determine what standards must be 
satisfied in such investigations.  Although this question is rarely asked, 
it lies at the core of the investigative role.  Commentators and officials 
tend to emphasize independence in their discussions of investigation 
reliability.
76
  As we shall see, however, an investigation can be inde-
pendent but indifferent to other critical reliability concerns. 
So what does make an investigation satisfactory?  To answer, we 
must examine the nature and purpose of the reliance or duty investi-
gation to identify its core truth commitment.  Thereafter, we will look 
to insights from law, philosophy, and jurisprudence to refine our un-
derstanding of this truth commitment and what it entails.  From this, 
we will develop an account of the core truth or reliability standards or 
elements that counsel must satisfy in reliance and duty investigations 
( “truth standards”).  We will also ask how each of these duties should 
be understood against the background of a client relationship.  We 
will close Part III by identifying and considering four additional im-
plications of the truth standards: the degree of certainty implied by 
the investigative effort, whether such standards can be disclaimed by 
investigative counsel in the resulting report, why a detailed analysis 
 
note 18, the corporation may later decide to waive such privilege and work-product 
protections and disclose the report to a third party.  While the corporation chooses 
whether to waive attorney-client privilege in the reliance investigation, the corpora-
tion may be forced to disclose information developed in certain duty investigations, 
such as employment-related investigations.  See Payton, 691 A.2d at 334 (“If the pur-
pose [of the internal investigation] was to provide legal advice or to prepare for liti-
gation, then the privilege applies. However, if the purpose was simply to enforce de-
fendant’s anti-harassment policy or to comply with its legal duty to investigate and to 
remedy the allegations, then the privilege does not apply.”). For a discussion of at-
torney-client confidentiality under the attorney-ethics rules in light of Sarbanes-
Oxley, see Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault 
Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089 (2006). 
 76 See, e.g., Shepard & Buehler, supra note 12, at 386; Glassman, supra note 66 (“I 
would suggest that the company consider conducting an independent internal inves-
tigation—and I stress the term ‘independent,’ in definition as well as spirit.”) 
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should accompany conclusions, and how the truth standards help us 
understand and refine tort duties. 
A. An Accurate Account 
An investigator who conducts a reliance or duty investigation is 
required to develop an accurate account.  This issue is best examined 
from two perspectives.  The first asks what the investigator implies in 
her account of the facts, the law, and their application.  The second 
looks to the intended use of the investigation. 
The term “investigation” makes clear that the information pre-
sented by the investigator is the result of inquiry and that it is neither 
conjecture, personal opinion, nor a simple transmission of client in-
formation.
77
  It is conducted outside the adversary setting, and thus it 
cannot take refuge in the adversary theory that truth will emerge 
from the clash of viewpoints.
78
  The investigation is not the place for 
advocacy. 
79
 
If the investigative report is not opinion, conjecture, client in-
formation relayed, or advocacy, how can we characterize the informa-
tion it reports?  The internal investigation purports to be based on 
the knowledge of the investigator.  Knowledge, in turn, is generally 
understood to mean justified and true belief.
80
  Thus, the investigator 
vouches for the information she offers.  Later, this Article will explore 
the nature of the justification that grounds her propositions
81
 as well 
as the degree of confidence in the information she presents.  Here, 
the emphasis is on the substantive claim of the internal investigation: 
 
 77 See 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 47 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “investigation” to 
include “the making of a search or inquiry; systematic examination; careful and 
minute research”).  For a discussion of the role of disclaimers by investigative counsel 
about the nature of the investigative inquiry, see infra Part III.D.   
 78 For an excellent reconstruction and critique of the truth finding and other ra-
tionales that ground the adversary system, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY 67–103 (1988).   
 79 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. c (2000) 
(“A lawyer providing an evaluation purporting to be a fair and objective evaluation 
does not function as an advocate for the legal or factual position of the lawyer’s 
client.”).   
 80 See generally Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Analysis of Knowledge 
(Fall 2008 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/knowledge-
analysis/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (offering a thorough introduction to the subject, 
and discussing the famous Gettier problem, which questions the sufficiency of this 
account of knowledge and the deep disagreement about the nature of justification).  
The difficulties that philosophers have identified with this definition of knowledge 
are unimportant for present purposes.   
 81 See infra Parts III.A.3, III.B.   
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it offers information not as averment, opinion, or guess, but instead 
as the truth or as an “accurate account.”82 
The recipient is, of course, very much aware of the investigator’s 
commitment to accuracy.  Consider the reliance investigation, such as 
counsel’s investigation of a client to be delivered to a third party for 
the latter’s use.83  The third party has reason to rely on the investiga-
tion and report because the report purports to offer an accurate ac-
count.
84
  In addition, the client will also be affected by a report deli-
vered to a third party that describes and analyzes the client’s 
behavior.  An investigative report that unfairly implicates the client 
can harm the client who commissioned the report.
85
  Conversely, a 
report that unfairly exonerates the client can disserve the third party 
that relies on the report.  An accurate account navigates the only safe 
harbor between the interests of the client and third party.
86
 
A commitment to an accurate account is likewise an essential 
condition of a duty investigation.  Recall that the corporation com-
missions a duty investigation to fulfill its duty of inquiry under the du-
ty of care or a statutory requirement, such as Sarbanes-Oxley.
87
  If a 
corporation is to have the benefit of an internal investigation to assist 
in satisfying its duty of inquiry, it must have reason to believe that the 
investigation is accurate. Both the duty of care and Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
 82 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR COMPANIES AND 
THEIR COUNSEL IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, in 1737 PLI/CORP. 459, 478 
(Practicing Law Inst., Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. 18499, 2009) [herei-
nafter RECOMMENDED PRACTICES] (“Special Counsel should be instructed to engage 
in investigative tactics designed to get at the truth, including using their investigative, 
technological, and professional capabilities.”).  Although at times this Article will use 
the terms “truth” and “accuracy” interchangeably, the substantive commitment of the 
investigation will be termed “accuracy” or an “accurate account” since legal analysis, 
as we shall argue, may be best understood as the interpretation of the professional 
community rather than distinct from any person’s view.  See infra Part III.A.2.  As a 
result, “accuracy” may capture the outcome of the investigator’s legal analysis, which 
in a sense predicts how the legal system will characterize the behavior more precisely 
than the term “truth.”   
 83 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (2007) (allowing lawyer to con-
duct evaluation “for the use of someone other than the client”); supra Part II.A.3.a. 
 84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. c (2000) 
(“Unless otherwise required or permitted by the terms under which the evaluation is 
given, the lawyer’s duty is to provide a fair and objective opinion.”).   
 85 It would, moreover, violate MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1, which re-
quires candor and independent professional judgment in advising a client.   
 86 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (requiring compatibility be-
tween client and third-party obligations in order to undertake a reliance investiga-
tion). 
 87 See supra Part II.A.3.b. 
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require reasonable inquiry.
88
  If a corporation does not have reason to 
believe that the investigative report is committed to developing an 
accurate account, then that corporation cannot reasonably rely on 
the investigation in fulfillment of an inquiry duty.
89
 
Therefore, an accurate account—as we shall come to define it—
is the first standard imposed on a reliance- or duty-based internal 
corporate investigation.  The immediate question that such a stan-
dard poses, however, is what “accuracy” means and what it entails  for 
the investigator.
90
  If commentators have resisted imposing an obliga-
tion of accuracy on an investigator, their concern may stem from the 
seemingly quixotic nature of such a standard.  Does the law really 
admit of accuracy in an objective sense?  If not, how can we require as 
much from investigative counsel?  If so, can we devise a workable 
standard of accuracy that accommodates the interpretive range of le-
gal questions? 
The nature of objective truth presents foundational questions in 
a variety of settings where inquiry is the norm,
91
 and the problems are 
no less vexing in the internal-investigation context.  If lawyers have 
averted such controversies in practice, they have done so because 
their typical calling is advocacy, not objectivity.  The question, howev-
er, is what must a lawyer do when he seeks not to advocate but to pro-
vide an accurate factual and legal account?  We turn to this problem 
next. 
1. Objectivity and Professional Judgment 
A first question is what—if anything—is there for an investigator 
to be accurate about?  This question concerns what philosophers 
have termed “metaphysical objectivity,” whether the “existence and 
character” of the entity in question is independent of the human 
mind, including the perceptions, beliefs, judgments of the observer, 
or, in our case, the investigator.
92
  If the information investigated and 
reported in an internal investigation is not objective in some meta-
physical sense, then the investigative report would be nothing more 
 
 88 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.   
 89 See RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 82, at 491 (citing goal of independent 
committee charged with overseeing investigation as, inter alia, “to determine the 
truth of the underlying allegations”). 
 90 See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 91 For an example outside the legal setting, see infra note 98 and accompanying 
text.   
 92 See Brian Leiter, Law and Objectivity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 969, 970–71 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro 
eds., 2002).    
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than an opinion or personal belief of the investigator, and there 
would be no basis for imposing special truth standards in the investi-
gation. 
Three “entities” can be identified in an internal investigation: 
(1) the facts concerning the allegations of wrongdoing that triggered 
the investigation; (2) the legal standards that are implicated by the 
facts; and (3) application of those facts to legal principles to deter-
mine whether the alleged wrongdoing has occurred. 
93
  Thus, the first 
question is whether and to what extent the existence and nature of 
each of the investigation entities (i) depends on what the investigator 
believes about them, which would qualify as “subjectivism,” or (ii) is 
distinct from what the investigator or anyone else believes, which has 
been termed “strong objectivism.”94 
Although categories (i) and (ii) nicely correspond with our ini-
tial understanding of objectivity, they are better understood as the 
boundary categories in a more nuanced account.  Philosophers have 
developed two intermediate categories of how objectivity might be 
understood given that neither boundary category captures our think-
ing about certain subjects—fashion or morality, for example.95  Thus, 
“minimal objectivism” holds that what is right is defined by what the 
community thinks is right, a category that seems to capture our intui-
tions about how to speak about what is fashionable.
96
  The remaining 
intermediate category, “modest objectivity,” holds that what is right is 
what “seems right under appropriate or ideal conditions.”97 
The investigator’s search for the facts appears to be the best 
candidate for the strongly objective account.  Our initial sense of 
what it means to “get it right” with respect to matters such as witness 
statements, chronologies of events, and material statements reflects 
the notion that there is truth “out there” that the investigator needs 
to capture, transcribe, or relay.  The ideal of truth-finding has long 
been controversial among historians, however, whose role in many 
 
 93 Of course, the categories overlap.  See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of 
Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 14 (1992) (noting difficulty of distinguishing 
“questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact”). 
 94  See Leiter, supra note 92, at 971–93.   
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id.  Thus, the four categories, ascending toward the ideal of objectivity, are 
subjectivism, minimal objectivism, modest objectivism, and strong objectivism.   
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ways parallels the fact-finding task of the internal investigator com-
pounded further by the ravages of time.
98
 
While skeptics have questioned the accuracy with which the legal 
system describes factual truth, 
99
 the critique has hardly persuaded 
courts to abandon the ideal of truth seeking in the factual setting.  
Our justice system presupposes that there are objective factual truths.  
For example, testimony can be true or false
100
 and juries can succeed 
or err in their search for the truth.
101
  Thus, while the practicalities of 
truth finding pose fundamental concerns, there is a viable sense in 
which the first of the investigative entities, the facts, is—for our pur-
poses at least—rightly described as objective in the strongest sense.  
The truth or falsity of the facts in an internal investigation does not 
depend on the state of mind of the investigator, the community, or 
even the conditions under which they are determined.
102
 
The next investigative element is the determination of the legal 
standards and principles that bear on the facts reported by the inves-
tigator.  Perhaps the most trenchant and influential challenge to the 
claim of objectivity of law was leveled by the American legal realists; 
realists generally agree that the multiplicity of precedents, often con-
flicting, means that few legal standards are mandated in any case, and 
 
 98 Compare EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 6 (MacMillan, 1961) (“The 
belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the 
interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard 
to eradicate.”), and Barbara W. Tuchman, When Does History Happen?, in PRACTICING 
HISTORY 25, 26 (Tuchman et al. eds., 1981) (“I therefore declare myself a firm be-
liever in the ‘preposterous fallacy’ of historical facts existing independently of the 
historian . . . . [Carr] might just as well say the Grecian Urn would not exist without 
Keats.”), with MARTHA HOWELL & WALTER PREVENIER, FROM RELIABLE SOURCES 149 
(2001) (acknowledging that many historians today would argue that any “reality that 
lay behind the sources” is inaccessible no matter how skilled the historian, but that 
“sources are all we have” and that we can still “learn something by reading them care-
fully”).      
 99 See JEROME N. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 
22–23, 37 (3d prtg. 1973).  For example, leading American Realist Judge Jerome 
Frank argued that factual findings are subjective.  Id.  The reactions of judges and 
juries are “shot through with subjectivity.”  Id.  H.L. Ho persuasively argues, however, 
that Frank’s statement was not a contention that the justice system is inherently flawed 
as a finder of fact but a call to reform the system to more closely approach the ideal 
of objectivity.  H.L. HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW 56 (2008).   
 100 The perjury laws, for example, presuppose as much.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 
(2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2006).     
 101 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (stating that an appellate court can reverse factual 
findings below that are clearly erroneous).   
 102 See Susan Haack, Truths, Truths, “Truth,” and “Truths” in the Law, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 17, 19 (2003) (“[F]actual claims at issue in legal proceedings are usually 
straightforwardly true or else false, and should cause no special unease about truth 
or objectivity.”). 
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judges have considerable discretion in the selection of which 
precedent to apply.
103
  To this might be added the range of tech-
niques for reading precedent, from broad principles to the most con-
fined factual specifics, which affords the decision maker still more 
discretion.
104
  More fundamentally, others have argued that legal rules 
are not “complete” because they do not self-identify the situations to 
which they are applicable.
105
  To this we might add the indeterminate 
nature of legal standards, as well as the ambiguity of legal language.
106
  
Moreover, the application of legal principles may be even more 
judgment-laden.  For example, criminal and civil standards typically 
require determination of mental states—intentionality, recklessness, 
reasonableness, and so on.
107
  Certainly, reasonable persons can dis-
agree on what results follow when one applies these and other legal 
standards to a given set of facts. 
Critical legal studies also make claims about the indeterminacy 
of law.
108
  Regardless of one’s position on the more sweeping claims of 
critical legal studies, many accept the precept that “judges—
conservative or liberal—do not find the answers to hard questions in 
legal precedent or legal logic alone.”109  Because judges can interpret 
statutes and laws in a variety of ways, they “can often find ways to ad-
 
 103 See WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 55–56 (1968).   
 104 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72–73 (7th prtg. 1981) (“This rule 
holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.”).   
 105 See, e.g., George C. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, 1313–14 
(1969).   
 106 Larry Solum argues that the categories of determinate or indeterminate may 
not be exhaustive and that law might also be underdeterminate, i.e., there exists more 
than one choice but not any choice would be legitimate under the applicable rule. 
Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 488, 489–90 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).  For an earlier, more extensive 
treatment of the question (albeit one on which certain of the author’s views have 
since changed), see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).  Kent Greenawalt suggests that in many, but 
not all, cases law is sufficiently determinate to count as objective when all sources and 
the best arguments are brought to bear on the decision.  KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND 
OBJECTIVITY 226, 234 (1992).   
 107 See Bennett et al., supra note 12, at 59 (arguing that gauging the intent of ac-
tors is the “key element” of an internal investigation).   
 108 See Allan C. Hutchinson, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1, 4–5 (Allan C. 
Hutchinson ed., 1989).  
 109 Lani Guinier, Foreword to Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
121 (2008).   
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vance their ideologies through legal argument and still sincerely 
claim to be upholding the rule of law.”110 
Brian Leiter presupposes that a condition of law’s objectivity is 
its determinacy, i.e., if law is objective, there must be some sense in 
which there exist “objectively correct answers” to legal questions.111  
By this standard, the critique of the realists and others poses a real 
challenge, given their arguments that law is anything but determi-
nate.  If the investigator can choose from a variety of precedents and 
exercise considerable discretion in interpreting these standards and 
applying them to the facts, can we really hope to hold the investigator 
to a standard of objectivity on questions of law and its application—
the latter two of the investigative elements? 
Law may be best understood as objective in the minimal sense, 
i.e., what seems right to the community is the right answer.  While the 
opinion of the community may not be right in some ultimate sense, it 
is objective in that it is in that it both has boundaries and is not based 
on the state of mind of the judge.
112
  “Conventionalists,” for example, 
argue that: 
The judge’s choice is constrained by a set of rules (or norms, 
standards, principles, guides, etc.) that are authorized by the pro-
fessional community of which the judge is part (and that define 
and constitute the community) . . . . Adherence to the rules au-
thorized by the professional community imparts a measure of im-
personality to a legal judgment (its objective quality) and at the 
same time provides the standards for evaluating the correctness of 
the judgment as a legal judgment.” 
113
 
The latter account may come closest to capturing the sense in 
which an internal investigation can be understood as “accurate.”  
While we cannot measure the investigator’s conclusion against some 
Platonic ideal, the investigator’s legal analysis and conclusions—like 
 
 110 Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundaries Between Law and Politics, 110 
YALE L.J. 1407, 1442 (2001).    
 111 Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 TEX. L. REV. 187, 197 
(1993) (reviewing GREENAWALT, supra note 106).   
 112 Id. at 207–08 (reasoning that if law is to constrain us, it cannot be objective in 
the strongest or modest sense because on such account the correct answers are not 
accessible to those whom it commands).    
 113 Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 183 (1985).  For an over-
view of this approach, see Dennis M. Patterson, An Introduction to Conventionalism, 10 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 43 (1988).  Dennis Patterson challenges the subjective/objective 
dichotomy and would direct our search for objectivity away from some “mind-
independent” truth and toward a more normative examination of precisely what is 
agreed upon as being fact.  Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 325, 327–28 (2001).   
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those of a judge—are constrained by professional standards of analy-
sis and interpretation.
114
 
The idea that the standards of the professional community serve 
as boundaries for legal interpretation is consistent with the degree of 
judgment that undeniably is at work in rendering a legal assessment.  
As Brad Wendell has observed, rules alone do not mandate conclu-
sions to legal questions: 
The decision maker must consider texts, principles, and facts, as 
well as subsidiary norms such as rules of legal salience (which 
point to aspects of the facts that are germane to the decision), 
considerations of weight and priority among competing norms, 
and the possibility of justified departures from previously sanc-
tioned interpretations.
115
 
This interpretive element explains how judges can arrive at dif-
fering interpretations in the same matter without undermining the 
claim that law is, in some sense, objective. 
116
  A decision is no longer 
objective when it strays beyond the boundaries of acceptable profes-
sional interpretation of the materials.
117
  This appeal to professional 
standards as the source of law’s objectivity has particular resonance 
for the inquiry here.  The investigator’s report is valued not for its 
idiosyncratic “take” on the law and its application but for its predic-
tion of how the legal system would assess the behavior in question.
118
 
Thus, the “right answer” in an internal investigation may exist in 
only the weakest metaphysical sense for certain aspects of the investi-
gation, such as law or its application.  Nonetheless, the existence of a 
right answer—even if based on only the accepted interpretive stan-
dards of the legal community—implies that investigative analysis is 
independent of the mind of the investigator who seeks it.  The inves-
tigator has, in other words, a substantive goal—an accurate account 
 
 114 See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 
1191 (2005) (arguing that legal judgment “is a community-bound enterprise, in 
which the criteria for reasonable exercise of judgment are elaborated intersubjective-
ly, among an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to law”). 
 115 Id. at 1193–94.   
 116 Id. at 1195 (“An observer might disagree with B, and believe that A was the bet-
ter result, but nevertheless concede that B was within the range of plausible, justifia-
ble results.”).   
 117 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 748 (1982).   
 118 Of course, conventionalism is not the only means by which we might seek to 
arrive at an objective account.   For example, Ronald Dworkin famously argued that 
there is a right answer to legal questions, albeit in some instances discernable only by 
the interpretive efforts of a superhuman Judge Hercules, in selecting the principle 
that coheres best with the “great network of political structures and decisions” of the 
community.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 245 (1986).   
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of the law, the facts, and their application.  Our next concern is what 
this goal means in practice. 
2. Objectivity and Procedure 
If the facts, law, and their application are objective in some 
sense, however modest, then there is reason to adopt procedures that 
will lead us to an “accurate account.”  This is what philosophers have 
termed “epistemological” objectivity, i.e., the cognitive and procedur-
al elements that enhance our prospects of arriving at the right an-
swer.
119
  “Epistemological objectivity obtains when either of the follow-
ing is true: (1) the cognitive processes at issue reliably produce 
accurate representations, or (2) the cognitive processes are free of 
factors that are known to produce inaccurate representations.”120 
Epistemological objectivity does not demand that we arrive at an 
exact representation of the facts or law, which may be more than is 
“attainable.”121  In practice, given the limits of the investigative 
process, we know that no account can achieve the ideal of perfect ac-
curacy.  The investigator’s goal, therefore, is to achieve as accurate an 
account as is practicable.
122
  To this end, we must adopt cognitive 
processes that reliably lead to accuracy and eliminate those factors 
known to produce inaccurate accounts. 
123
 
Thus, the next step is to identify standards that will increase the 
prospects of developing an accurate account in an internal investiga-
tion.  The reliability factors must be specific not only to the domain 
of law but also to the investigative setting.  The investigative domain 
differs starkly from the adversarial approach to truth finding.  In the 
adversarial setting, the clash of interests, factual accounts, and legal 
arguments assists the jury or judge in reaching a correct understand-
ing of what transpired, what legal standards govern, and what result 
 
 119 See Leiter, supra note 92, at 973.   
 120 Id.  As noted earlier, for the investigator to claim knowledge with respect to an 
assertion in an investigative report, she must, on the traditional account, have a justi-
fied true belief.  On some “reliabilist” accounts of knowledge, the reliability of the 
cognitive process provides this justification or supplants the justification element en-
tirely.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supra note 80.   
 121 Leiter, supra note 92, at 973. 
 122 FRANK, supra note 99, at 35–36 (stating with regard to the legal system that 
“[p]erfect justice lies beyond human reach[, b]ut the unattainability of the ideal is 
no excuse for shirking the effort to obtain the best available”). 
 123 The procedures that enhance reliability will vary with the domain in question; 
for example, law implicates different epistemological-objectivity concerns than 
science.  Leiter, supra note 92, at 973.   
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they mandate.
124
  The adversary system, in other words, is a procedur-
al means to enhance accuracy.  In the investigative setting, where 
there is only one voice, we must be sensitive to the absence of this 
process and rely instead on other tools that tend toward reliability.  
The truth standards that follow are designed to produce epistemolog-
ical objectivity in the investigative domain.  They are, in other words, 
procedural means that lead reliably to an accurate account in an in-
ternal investigation. 
B. The Truth Standards: Tools of Accuracy 
As previously discussed, the investigator must employ procedures 
that are designed to lead to an accurate account.  To this end, we will 
identify and examine four procedures that are especially valuable in 
this search and that reflect the special, nonadversarial role of the in-
vestigator—independence, sufficient inquiry, evidentiary reliability, 
and professional judgment.  While the standards that follow are not 
intended to be exhaustive, they are fundamental procedures that 
substantially increase the prospects of an account that is accurate 
and, therefore, worthy of reliance. 
1. Independence 
An investigator who has an obligation or an interest that will be 
disserved by offering an accurate account is less likely to do so.  In 
both reliance and duty investigations, there is deep potential for con-
flict between an investigator’s finding of wrongdoing and the client’s 
interest in avoiding such culpability.  In the reliance investigation, a 
conflict that diverts an investigator from the truth will typically dis-
serve the interests of the third party that relies on the report.  In the 
duty investigation, the same conflict can prevent the client from re-
ceiving a report that satisfies the duty to inquire, thereby harming the 
shareholders or others whom the duty is designed to protect.  Thus, 
the accurate-account standard warrants protection against conflicts of 
interest that can undermine the reliability of the internal investiga-
tion.
125
  We will term this the independence standard.
126
 
 
 124 For an analysis of the justifications for the adversary system and a critique of 
those reasons, see LUBAN, supra note 78, at 67–103; DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 19–64 (2007).   
 125 Although accuracy provides the principal grounding for the prohibition on 
conflicts, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L COND. R. 2.3(a) (2007) provides additional support 
for reliance investigations in the requirement that the investigative role must be 
“compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.”  The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act provides additional support for duty investigations in § 307, which 
authorizes the audit committee of the board of directors to retain independent 
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Two categories of conflict can undermine the accuracy of an in-
ternal investigation.  The first stems from the investigator’s commit-
ments to advance client interests on issues that relate to the investiga-
tion, which we will term “advocacy conflicts.”  The second concerns 
interests of the investigator that might divert her from the truth, 
which we will term biasing interests.  We will consider each in turn. 
The advocacy conflict flows from the divergent demands of the 
representative and investigative roles.  The advocacy role frees coun-
sel from any pretense of objectivity or impartiality and requires coun-
sel to shape her arguments and the presentation of facts to advance 
the client’s view, short of knowing misrepresentation and other ethi-
cal and legal limits. 
127
  The investigative role demands objectivity.  
One who seeks to advocate and protect one party is, by definition, not 
objective with respect to such issue.  Thus, an investigator can have 
no advocacy functions with respect to the conduct and report of the 
investigation.
128
  As used here, “advocacy” is not limited to the litiga-
tion role but denotes any obligation or effort of the investigative at-
torney to protect or advance the interests of the client related to an 
issue in the investigation.  To cite an obvious example, an attorney 
charged with minimizing the exposure of the client on an issue has 
an advocacy conflict that precludes her service in the investigative 
role with respect to such issues. 
The call for neutrality on all issues related to the investigation, 
though hardly surprising, presents a real practical challenge in the 
investigation.  The client retains investigative counsel, pays for the in-
vestigation, is the subject of the investigation, and has a deep, vested 
interest in the outcome of the investigation, since criminal and civil 
liability may hinge on the findings.  Thus, the gravitational pull of the 
 
counsel.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002).  Although the Act de-
scribes the independence required of audit committee members, it does not elabo-
rate on what constitutes an “independent” investigator or establish any other stan-
dards with respect to the investigation.  See Shepard & Buehler, supra note 64, at 387. 
 126 Although the emphasis here, as elsewhere, is on the truth obligations of inves-
tigative counsel, it should be noted that the corporate client has grave potential for 
conflicts of interest that can undermine the trustworthiness of their conclusions.  
The allegations might, for example, allege wrongdoing against senior management 
or the corporation itself.  Thus, in these and other instances of conflict, the corpora-
tion should delegate the supervision of the investigation to the audit committee of 
the board of directors or to a committee of independent directors.  See 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 82, at 476. 
 127 See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
63, 73 (1980) (analyzing the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role”).   For a 
book-length critique of the standard conception of advocacy, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, 
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998). 
 128 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. c.   
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client is considerable, but investigative counsel must resist it if she is 
to remain objective.  Investigative counsel cannot assume any advoca-
cy roles with respect to the conduct and reporting of an investigation 
that is subject to the truth standards.
129
  Moreover, advocacy objectives 
are not strictly those that are overtly adversarial but include less ob-
vious efforts to protect or advance the interests of the client—as we 
shall see in Part IV, which considers the truth standards in applica-
tion.  Thus, lawyers who would serve as investigators must don the hat 
of neutrality, no small feat for American lawyers who practice in such 
a litigious and adversarial legal system.
130
 
A second category of interests can steer the investigation away 
from the truth.  These biasing interests include interests of the inves-
tigator that threaten to undermine her commitment to an accurate 
account.  Examples of interests that may qualify as biasing include the 
investigator’s longstanding employment by the client, which a nega-
tive investigation report may jeopardize; a financial interest in the 
client; and close personal relationships with the persons under inves-
tigation.
131
 
The role of biasing interests must be considered more closely, 
however, before we flatly prohibit them in service of our indepen-
dence standard.  Unlike an advocacy conflict, which disserves either 
the attorney-client role or a third-party interest (unless the truth 
happens to help the client’s cause), a biasing interest does not guar-
antee a faulty investigative effort or report.  An investigator may simp-
ly rise above her interest in preserving a job, client, or friendship and 
report the unvarnished truth despite the consequences. 
If a biasing interest will not necessarily skew the investigation, 
why and when should we prohibit them?  As Andrew Stark explains, 
biasing interests are especially problematic when the role in question 
involves discretion and judgment. 
132
  As discussed earlier, on the con-
 
 129 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 3 (2007) (noting that an at-
torney who serves as an advocate for the corporation with respect to an allegation of 
fraud has an irreconcilable conflict in providing an evaluation for a third party on 
that issue).  Thus, conflicts of interest pose not only grave concerns about the relia-
bility of the investigation, but ethical concerns for investigative counsel as well.   
 130 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 
(2001) (“American methods of litigating and adjudicating legal disputes are more 
costly and adversarial” than in other “economically advanced democracies.”). 
 131 See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing cases that have considered these various bias 
interests).   
 132 ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 22–23 (2000).   
In the policy-making arena, where Stark directs much of his inquiry, decisions are 
presumably more judgment-based than in the investigation setting addressed here, 
where legal conclusions have a stronger (though qualified) claim to objectivity.  See 
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ventional view, the interpretive standards of the professional com-
munity constrain legal assessments, but such standards do not elimi-
nate the judgment and discretion entailed in conducting an internal 
investigation.
133
  These include decisions over how to characterize the 
underlying question and the scope of the investigation; whom to in-
terview; what questions to ask; whose statements are trustworthy and 
whose are not; what facts, statements, and documents deserve empha-
sis; and the application of law to the factual narrative developed.
134
  
Moreover, the allegations that trigger the investigation often require 
the investigator to assess the mens rea of the participants, since crim-
inal liability often turns on whether the wrongdoing was intentional 
or otherwise.
135
  Thus, on a question that often lies at the core of the 
investigation, the investigator may be asked to make fine-grained 
judgments about the subjective states of actors, ranging between 
knowing, intentional, reckless, and negligent.  While these judgments 
are bounded by the constraints of professional interpretation, there is 
sufficient range within such boundaries for an investigator’s conclu-
sion to appear legitimate even if biased.
136
 
The recipient of an investigative report is therefore left with the 
difficult question of whether to trust the report.  Given the consider-
able consequences that attach to reliance on the results of an internal 
investigation, the question is critical.  A recipient of the report could 
examine the contents of the report for clues to the extent and tho-
roughness of the investigation, the internal consistency of the analy-
sis, the depth and quality of the reasoning, and whether the facts de-
veloped and legal standards applied support and are consistent with 
the conclusions.  This sort of inquiry is valid and helpful, but it will 
more likely discern whether the investigator has crafted a report that 
is within the canons of professional judgment, not whether it was free 
from bias.  Thus, bias interests create a genuine risk of compromising 
the truth in an internal investigation, and the recipient of the report 
 
supra Part III.A.2.  For an insightful review of Stark’s work, see W. Bradley Wendel, 
The Deep Structure of Conflicts of Interest, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (2003) (book re-
view).   
 133 See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra Parts III.B.   
 135 Bennett et al., supra note 12, at 58–59 (“Understanding why employees acted as 
they did is . . . the most subtle and important goal of the internal investigation.  It 
amounts to a ‘search for intent,’ which is the key element in most criminal cases in-
volving corporate misconduct.”). 
 136 Wendel, supra note 132, at 475 (noting that there are no “algorithms” by which 
to evaluate the correctness of legal decisions after the fact). 
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will have no viable means of determining whether in fact that was the 
case. 
The Model Rules offer guidance in their treatment of a bias in a 
distinct but analogous setting, barring an attorney from representing 
a client  if there is a “significant risk” that the attorney’s personal in-
terests “materially” limit the client representation.137  The Restatement 
of the Law Governing Lawyers adopts a similar approach, prohibiting 
representation if there is a “substantial risk” that the lawyer’s “finan-
cial or other personal interests” will “materially and adversely” affect 
the representation.
138
  The Restatement standard, moreover, is 
grounded on a rationale that parallels our concern regarding bias in-
terests in the investigation setting: personal interests can undermine 
the pursuit of client interests, and it is difficult to discern, after the 
fact, whether counsel has subordinated his personal interests to serv-
ing the client.
139
 
The standard is helpful in analyzing what biasing interests are 
unacceptable in the investigation.  Counsel should not conduct an 
internal investigation if there is a substantial risk that the interests, 
incentives, or obligations of investigative counsel arising out of the 
relationship with the client would materially divert the investigator 
from providing an accurate account.  In Part IV, we will consider this 
standard in practice. 
Independence alone is not enough to warrant confidence in the 
reliability of an internal investigation, though commentators and of-
ficials sometimes imply that it is sufficient.
140
  The goal of an internal 
investigation is an accurate account, not independence.
141
  Indepen-
dence is one of a series of tools designed to enhance reliability.  An 
independent investigation is not reliable if it is hampered by insuffi-
cient inquiry, indifference to the reliability of the evidence, or a fail-
ure of professional judgment. 
 
 137 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2007). 
 138 Id.   
 139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. b.   
 140 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.   
 141 See Kaplan et al., supra note 12, at 1022 (“Indeed, independence can be viewed 
not as an end in itself, but as a means of ensuring that issues of corporate misconduct 
will be addressed in an open-minded, objective manner.”).  The article proceeds, 
however, to treat the adequacy of an investigation as evidence of “independence,” a 
conceptual conflation resulting from the failure to identify the core substantive goal 
of the investigation, accuracy, and to treat the procedural reliability standards as dis-
tinctive means to such end.  See id. 
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2. Sufficient Inquiry 
We turn next to the scale of the inquiry that must ground an in-
vestigative report.  If the factual findings of the report are to be accu-
rate, they must be based on an inquiry that is sufficient to uncover 
the facts concerning the alleged wrongdoing.
142
  Likewise, the re-
search that grounds the legal analysis in an investigative report must 
be sufficient to determine the legal standards that the factual findings 
implicate.
143
 
As a practical matter, of course, there must be some limits on the 
extent of the inquiry.  With respect to factual findings, the accuracy 
standard requires investigative counsel to approach as closely as prac-
ticable the truth of what happened.  One way to conceptualize the 
practical limits of such an inquiry is to ask whether additional investi-
gation would pose a genuine prospect of discovering information 
that will have a material effect on the findings.
144
  Phrased affirmative-
ly, the investigator must inquire into the facts of the allegation until 
additional investigation no longer presents a genuine prospect of 
gaining information that will materially affect the findings.
145
  This 
formulation also describes the extent of the investigator’s research 
into the legal standards that are implicated by the factual findings.  
The investigator must research the legal standards implicated by the 
factual findings until additional research no longer presents a ge-
nuine prospect of gaining information that will materially affect the 
analysis or conclusions.  We will term this description of the factual 
and legal inquiry that should ground an investigative report the “suf-
ficient-inquiry standard,” which is the second of the truth standards 
designed to enhance the prospects of an accurate account. 
146
 
 
 142 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 4 (2007) (“The quality of an 
evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is 
based.”).   
 143 For cases considering the sufficiency of investigation, see infra note 221. 
 144 The term “genuine prospect” is chosen to dispel the false sense of precision 
that would accompany a standard that was quantitatively framed, such as preponder-
ance or likelihood.   
 145 The standard here is higher than that of relevant evidence, which means “evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 401.  Instead, the concern is whether the inves-
tigator’s findings would be materially altered by additional information, a standard 
more closely akin to the various definitions of materiality offered in the securities set-
ting.  See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).    
 146 Although the sufficiency standard derives principally from the accurate-
account standard, an array of additional standards also support it.  The attorney who 
delivers an investigative report expressly or impliedly states that the information is 
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Like all of the truth standards, the “sufficient-inquiry standard” 
poses a potential for conflict with client interests.  In a standard re-
presentation, the client has the authority to define (within limits) the 
scope of the agreed representation and to place reasonable limits on 
the expenditures of counsel.
147
  Likewise, in the investigation context, 
a client understandably may not want the inquiry to extend beyond 
the reasonable boundaries of the matter at hand and does not want 
to issue a blank check to investigative counsel.  These client concerns, 
however, can also serve as a pretext for subverting the investigative 
process.  The client may wish to impose limitations on the inquiry 
simply to reduce cost regardless of the effect on the quality of the in-
vestigation.  The client may seek to limit counsel’s investigation, in-
cluding investigative counsel’s access to certain documents or wit-
nesses, in order to reduce the prospects of uncovering wrongdoing.  
With respect to these disagreements, investigative counsel should ac-
cept no client-imposed limitation on the investigation that will pre-
vent her from complying with the sufficient-inquiry standard. 
The investigator has ample leverage in resisting client-imposed 
limitations that undermine sufficient inquiry, since they are likely to 
preclude her from producing an account that is worthy of reliance by 
the client or a third party.
148
  Conversely, the client retains the unfet-
tered right to terminate investigative counsel at any time,
149
 which 
remains an important client protection against unjustified expendi-
ture or other inappropriate behavior on the part of investigative 
counsel.  In practice, these competing demands require a delicate 
touch to ensure that neither the truth standards nor the client’s in-
terest in reasonable expenditure is compromised.
150
   
3. Evidentiary Reliability 
Investigators gather evidence and develop findings of fact relat-
ing to matters that are the subject of the internal investigation.  The 
 
backed by her (or her firm’s) inquiry. Therefore, an investigative report that is not 
backed by such inquiry violates MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 and 4.1, 
which prohibit false statements by counsel to courts and third parties, respectively.  
Moreover, a duty investigation that does not satisfy the sufficiency standard would 
not satisfy the reasonable investigation standards of the duty of care and Sarbanes-
Oxley.  See supra notes 62–63 and 67–69 and accompanying text.   
 147 See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) (providing that lawyers abide by client decisions re-
garding objectives of representation); id. cmt. 2 (noting that lawyers defer to clients 
regarding questions of expense). 
 148 See infra Part III.D for a discussion of investigation difficulties and their effect 
on the investigator’s conclusions.   
 149  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3).   
 150 See infra Part IV. 
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reliability of the evidence gathered is, of course, essential to the accu-
racy of the investigator’s account.  The investigation, however, is 
conducted outside the adversary process, which can be understood 
and justified in substantial part as a tool to enhance accuracy.
151
  
Thus, our third evaluation standard, evidentiary reliability, requires 
that the investigator address the special concerns regarding the relia-
bility of evidence that flows from the absence of adversarial or judicial 
checks on the investigative process.  In addition to finding facts, evi-
dentiary reliability calls for care and deliberation in evaluating the 
evidence collected.
152
 
Consider the testimony of the witnesses in a contested matter.  If 
material, that testimony is likely to be challenged rigorously by oppos-
ing counsel, who will search for inconsistencies with the witnesses’ 
prior statements, inconsistencies with other witnesses and documents, 
biases, deficiencies of perception, and problems of credibility.
153
  The 
investigator, by contrast, risks a certain passivity in this regard; she 
does not assume a questioning stance as a natural consequence of the 
self-interest that motivates an opposing party, but she also must not 
simply presume testimony and other evidence trustworthy due to the 
absence of contrary evidence.  The investigator, if she is to approach 
the rigor of the adversary process, must search actively for reliability 
problems from an imagined opposing perspective.
154
 
This is not to suggest that an investigator can elicit accurate and 
reliable testimony only by cross-examining interviewees with the bear-
ing of an incredulous adversary.  On the contrary, the witness who is 
treated fairly and with respect is likely to cooperate and provide a 
more thorough account.
155
  The investigator’s challenge, however, is 
 
 151 See supra notes 11, 124, 127 and accompanying text.   
 152 See HO, supra note 99, at 46 (“Findings of fact should not issue directly from 
intuitive gut feelings.  Insofar as they are supposed to be deliberated conclusions, the 
findings must be reached by identifying the reasons for the views tentatively held 
about the facts, and by reflecting on the validity and strength of those reasons.  This 
process of evaluation may lead to confirmation of the original views, or it may lead to 
their abandonment or revision.”). 
 153 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 19–48 (Edward W. Clearly ed., 3d ed. 
1984) (discussing cross-examination and impeachment of witness); MICHAEL E. 
TIGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES 187–249 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing cross-examination).   
 154 Investigative counsel must take care to explain that she represents the corpora-
tion or audit committee and not the witness, who may be an employee and therefore 
confused about the investigator’s loyalty.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.13(f).  See also RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 82, at 485–89 (discussing an ar-
ray of other steps that investigative counsel should take to avoid treating witnesses 
unfairly).  
 155 See Randall J. Turk & Mark Miller, The Witness Interview Process, in INTERNAL 
CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at 93, 108.   
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to elicit and challenge the testimony of a witness concurrently.  The 
absence of adversity offers not only a risk but an opportunity in this 
regard.  Because the matter is not contested, the investigator has no 
incentive to engage in histrionics, exaggeration of minor discrepan-
cies, embarrassment of witnesses, or other excesses to move a jury. 
The investigator not only combines the role of direct examiner 
and (respectful) cross examiner, she is also the judge and jury.  At 
trial, the judge makes threshold determinations about authenticity of 
documents as well as the admission of evidence.
156
  These questions 
are no less important in the investigative role, but as judge and fact 
finder the investigator will be exposed to evidence that may be inad-
missible at trial because it is untrustworthy—for example, prejudicial 
statements
157
 or hearsay that is not otherwise admissible.
158
  Thus, the 
investigator must not only question the trustworthiness of the evi-
dence she uncovers, but must also not allow the unreliable evidence 
to which she is exposed to affect her findings of fact.
159
 
In addition, as historians have long acknowledged, selection and 
emphasis can profoundly shape the factual narrative, even if it is 
grounded on reliable sources.
160
  This concern cannot be swept away 
by an injunction against bias.  Like the other evidentiary-reliability 
concerns, however, the bias of selection and emphasis can be tem-
pered by the investigator’s awareness of the problem and efforts to 
minimize the distorting effects.
161
  Even if no account corresponds 
perfectly with reality, an account that is sensitive to the dangers posed 
by selection and emphasis will come closer than one that is not. 
 
 156 FED. R. EVID. 104(a).   
 157 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 158 See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII. 
 159 This is not to suggest, however, that the investigator must comply strictly with 
the Rules of Evidence in developing a factual account.  The Rules do, however, identify 
types of evidence that can undermine the truth finding function, such as hearsay, 
unauthenticated documents, prejudicial statements, and so on.  A sensitivity to these 
and other concerns identified by the Rules will reduce the risk of an inaccurate ac-
count.    
 160 See Tuchman, supra note 98, at 49 (“The problem is how and what to select out 
of all that happened without, by the very process of selection, giving an over-
emphasis or under-emphasis which violates truth. . . . The job is to achieve a narrative 
line without straying from the essential facts or leaving out any essential facts and 
without twisting the material to suit one’s convenience.”). 
 161 See HOWELL & PREVENIER, supra note 98, at 148 (“The trick, then, is to construct 
our interpretations responsibly, with care, and with a high degree of self-
consciousness about our disabilities and the disabilities of our sources.”).  
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4. Professional Judgment 
As we have seen, the investigator’s obligation to deliver an accu-
rate account raises difficult questions about what it means to be accu-
rate in a legal matter.
162
  Laws, legal standards, and their application 
to a particular set of facts often require interpretation.  Given this in-
terpretive element, it is tempting to assume that the investigator’s 
task is to offer her own “take” on the issues.  The notion could hardly 
be more mistaken.  As discussed earlier, while law requires interpreta-
tion, that interpretation is hardly unbounded.  Law’s objectivity is 
grounded in the interpretive standards of the legal community.
163
 
Thus, our fourth truth standard is professional judgment.  The 
investigator must employ accepted professional standards of legal in-
terpretation and reasoning to analyze and apply the law, and to reach 
legal conclusions.  These professional norms guide and constrain the 
investigator.  The investigator’s legal conclusions are valuable to the 
extent that they accurately describe how the legal system would cha-
racterize the behavior in question.  The investigator can arrive at “ac-
curate” legal conclusions only through application of the interpretive 
standards and norms of the legal community, and not by giving voice 
to her personal predilections.
164
 
The canons, norms, methods, and standards that comprise pro-
fessional judgment are instilled through legal education, training, 
and practice, and thus do not bear useful summary here.
165
  We will 
limit ourselves here to a few comments to dispel basic misconcep-
tions.  While its goal is to enhance an objective or accurate account, 
professional judgment does not require a rigid or literal-minded ap-
proach to legal interpretation when “a myopic fixation on the literal 
language of the statute would cause an interpreter to miss the appar-
ent meaning of the text.”166  Conversely, professional judgment does 
not allow the interpreter “to impose her own policy preferences on 
the text.”167  The path between these markers is, of course, the es-
sence of professional judgment.  It may be the highest calling of the 
investigator. 
 
 162 See supra Part II.A.2.   
 163 See supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.   
 164 By analogy, as Owen Fiss argues, “Judges know that if they relinquish their 
membership in the interpretive community, or deny its authority, they lose their 
right to speak with the authority of the law.”  Fiss, supra note 117, at 747.   
 165 For an excellent theoretical and practical treatment of professional judgment, 
see Wendel, supra note 114, at 1167.   
 166 Id. at 1187. 
 167 Id. 
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Professional judgment should also inform the investigator’s in-
terpretation and application of the other truth standards.  For exam-
ple, although the sufficient-inquiry standard offers a method for de-
termining when further inquiry is necessary, it, like most standards, is 
not self-applying.  The investigator is required to exercise profession-
al judgment in determining, inter alia, whether to engage in addi-
tional inquiry.  The investigator’s interpretation of the truth stan-
dards, like any principles designed to offer general guidance, must be 
guided by the standards’ objective of enhancing the reliability of the 
investigator’s account.  Reliability remains the touchstone of the in-
vestigator’s efforts, and her sound professional judgment must in-
form interpretation and application of the standards designed to fos-
ter that goal. 
C. The Degree of Certainty 
The investigator expressly or impliedly claims that her findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are reliable or accurate because they 
are grounded in sound epistemological procedures and because they 
are guided and disciplined by sound professional judgment.
168
  Nei-
ther of these methods, however, claims to be foolproof.  The truth 
standards, even when satisfied, do not guarantee accuracy in findings 
of fact.  Moreover, legal interpretation, even when constrained by 
professional standards, will produce varied outcomes that can all fair-
ly be termed legitimate.
169
  Thus, the investigative report does not 
claim to offer certainty with respect to its findings and conclusions. 
To what degree of confidence does an investigator present her 
findings of fact and law?  In many ways, the standard adopted by 
some jurisdictions for admission of expert testimony—a reasonable 
degree of professional certainty or probability
170—offers a useful 
guide here.  The investigator’s conclusions are reasonably reliable 
because she has adhered to reliable procedures and engaged in the 
professional interpretation of the law.  The conclusions are not cer-
tain, however, because neither the procedures nor legal interpreta-
tion admit of certainty.  The standard rejects the poles of certainty 
and conjecture,
171
 and looks instead for reasonable certainty or relia-
bility.  The recipient of an investigative report has the right to pre-
sume as much about the investigator’s conclusions. 
 
 168 See supra Parts III.A and B.   
 169 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
 170 See, e.g., McMahon v. Young, 276 A.2d 534, 535 (Pa. 1971) (citing Mendarde v. 
Philadelphia Transp. Co, 103 A.2d 681 (1954)). 
 171 See Johnston v. Indus. Comm’n, 87 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Wis. 1958). 
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Part III.D–E  will consider two additional implications of the in-
vestigator’s commitment to an accurate account.  Given that the truth 
standards ground the investigator’s conclusions, we will consider next 
the significance of the investigator’s failure to satisfy these standards.  
Thereafter, we will explore the question posed by the role of profes-
sional judgment in the investigation: if professionals can disagree on 
matters of interpretation, why should an investigator’s conclusions be 
trusted? 
D. Reliability Qualifications 
When the investigator cannot satisfy one or more truth stan-
dards, we have reason for concern about the reliability of her findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.  At first blush, “limitations” or “qualifi-
cations” that identify problems with the investigation seem to offer an 
obvious solution.  On this view, the investigator presents findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to the reader and candor then requires 
disclosure of any material conditions that lessen their reliability.  On 
closer inspection, however, problems affecting the reliability of the 
investigation may or may not lend themselves to simple resolution 
with a list of qualifications of the findings of law and fact. 
When the investigator offers both conclusions and qualifications, 
the reader of the report must evaluate the significance of limitations 
on the investigation or its analysis.  If an investigator is required to 
develop the facts and analyze and report on their significance, why 
should we assume that the reader is an expert at measuring their re-
liability?  Consider what is left unanswered by this approach.  Is the 
investigator asserting that the findings of fact and legal conclusions 
are accurate despite the qualifications?  Or is the investigator suggest-
ing that the conclusions are not to be trusted because of the qualifi-
cations?  If the former, how is it possible that material limitations af-
fected the investigation but the outcome remains trustworthy?  If the 
latter, why has the investigator presented facts and conclusions when 
the limitations precluded development of a trustworthy account?  
More generally, if the investigator has sufficient discretion to deter-
mine which limitations on the investigation were material and thus 
necessary to qualify the report, why is she unable to discern their ef-
fect on the report itself? 
In fact, the professional judgment entailed in developing find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law is inexorably tied to an assessment 
of the quality and extent of the information uncovered in the investi-
gation.  An investigator cannot “find” a fact unless she has adequate 
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reason to believe that fact so.
172
  If, for example, a critical part of fact-
finding is an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their 
relation to other witness statements and documentary evidence,
173
 an 
investigator cannot be agnostic about whether she has access to such 
information.  Thus, an investigator’s assertion about the facts and 
their legal significance implies a great deal about the provenance of 
both assertions.  If an investigation is hampered by a material limita-
tion, one has a right to question not only the reliability of the investi-
gator’s conclusion but why she has offered a conclusion at all. 
Let us begin to unravel the mystery by identifying with some 
precision the problems with the investigation that must be disclosed 
by an investigator.  A material qualification warranting disclosure is 
any aspect of the investigation, analysis, or reporting that does not sa-
tisfy the truth standards or otherwise poses a genuine prospect of un-
dermining the reliability of the investigation.
174
  Clearly, the investiga-
tor must disclose such qualifications under legal ethics principles
175
  
and tort standards
176
 to avoid deceiving the reader. 
The investigator must do more than simply identify material qu-
alifications, however.  Conclusions and qualifications in tandem sug-
gest that the conclusions of fact and law are “reliable” in the investi-
gator’s professional judgment, but that the investigation that gave 
rise to these conclusions might pose material questions about reliabil-
ity.  The reader cannot be expected to solve this riddle.  The investi-
gator, and not the report recipient, has direct access to witnesses and 
the opportunity to evaluate their credibility based on their demeanor 
and their reaction to challenges and contrary evidence;
177
 the advan-
 
 172 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.   
 173 See supra Part III.A.3.   
 174 Again, the truth standards do not purport to be exhaustive, and thus there may 
be other failings that threaten the reliability of the investigation that warrant disclo-
sure.   
 175 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 4 (2007) (providing that limi-
tations on investigation should be noted in report); id. R. 4.1 (prohibiting knowing 
misstatements by counsel to a third party); id. R. 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting knowing 
misstatements to court); id. R. 2.1 (requiring candor and independent professional 
judgment in advising the client). 
 176 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 25.4 
(3d ed. Supp. 2010) (“A lawyer would almost certainly be liable in tort (for fraud or 
misrepresentation) if material limitations were not disclosed when third parties justi-
fiably assumed that there were none.”). 
 177 See, e.g., State v. Locurto, 724 A.2d 234, 238 (N.J. 1999) (requiring deference to 
fact finder on questions of credibility).  For a general discussion of evidentiary relia-
bility, see supra Part III.B.3.  
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tage of selection and emphasis in the reporting of facts;
178
 deeper, 
first-hand insight into the need for additional investigation and the 
risks to accuracy posed by the unavailability of witnesses;
179
 and the 
obligation to exercise professional judgment in assessing the mens 
rea of the actors in question and applying the facts to legal prin-
ciples.
180
  Even assuming the reader has the time, resources, and dis-
position to examine each of these issues, the questions are inherently 
contextual; they presuppose an understanding of the circumstances 
and settings in which the investigator’s decisions were made.  It is dif-
ficult to imagine what information—shy of conducting the investiga-
tion anew—could supply the report recipient with such context. 
Thus, while the recipient must remain vigilant about the accura-
cy of the investigation and report, the investigator has insight into the 
reliability of an investigation that the recipient of the report cannot 
hope to replicate.
181
  The investigator, by contrast, has better informa-
tion and also insight into how investigative deficiencies affected the 
outcome.  An investigator who does not know whether or how limita-
tions on the investigation affected the reliability of her conclusions 
has not engaged in sufficient deliberation about the truth standards 
to deliver a report.
182
 
A failure to satisfy one or more truth standards, or some other 
material deficiency in the investigation, can potentially affect the out-
come in three ways.  First, and most likely, the failure to satisfy the 
truth standards will render a conclusion inappropriate for one or 
more factual or legal questions.  If the truth standards substantially 
enhance the prospect of an accurate outcome, their absence substan-
tially increases the prospect of inaccuracy.  Thus understood, counsel 
has overwhelming incentive to comply with the truth standards, since 
their absence will likely foreclose her from offering a factual finding 
or legal conclusion on the issues affected by the deficiency.  By exten-
sion, the client has incentive not to prevent counsel from satisfying 
the truth standards because, by commissioning an investigation, the 
client presumably wishes counsel to produce a report that offers find-
ings and conclusions on the issues.
183
 
Second, and perhaps least likely, the investigator may conclude 
that the failure to satisfy the truth standards did not prevent her from 
 
 178 See supra Part III.B.3.  
 179 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 180 See supra Part III.B.4. 
 181 See infra Part III.E. 
 182 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.   
 183 See supra Part II.B. 
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reaching a reliable conclusion on an issue related to the deficiency.  
This is logically possible because, while the truth standards enhance 
reliability, the absence of one or more does not guarantee inaccura-
cy.  In those presumably rare instances in which counsel believes that 
she can render a conclusion despite a failure to satisfy the truth stan-
dards, disclosure and explanation would be necessary.  As we have 
noted, professional judgment requires investigative counsel to con-
sider the effect of material limits on the reliability of her conclusions, 
and she has greater insight into their effect than the typical reader of 
the report.
184
  As a result, disclosure of the qualification is not 
enough.  Counsel should identify the limits on the investigation and 
explain why her conclusions are reliable notwithstanding the defi-
ciency.  The reader, of course, may not be persuaded by the explana-
tion, which is why investigators and clients would prefer to satisfy the 
truth standards. 
A third possible consequence of the failure to satisfy the truth 
standards falls somewhere between the first two approaches.  As a re-
sult of a deficiency in procedure, the investigator might reach a fac-
tual or legal conclusion with a lesser degree of certainty.  Instead of a 
conclusion offered to a reasonable degree of professional certainty or 
some comparable formulation,
185
 the investigator might offer a con-
clusion but state that it is “tentative” or offer some other formulation 
that reflects the investigator’s diminished confidence in the reliability 
of the investigation (“reduced-confidence standard”).  Because read-
ers may not understand the reduced-confidence standard, the inves-
tigator should explain its significance.  The investigator should also 
identify the truth standard(s) not satisfied (or other material limita-
tions) and describe any effect on the investigator’s fact-finding and 
conclusions.  The investigator and her client have every reason to sa-
tisfy the truth standards because a report claiming a lesser standard of 
confidence in the outcome is less likely to warrant reliance by the re-
cipient, whether a third party or client.
186
 
An investigator may be unable to satisfy the truth standards not 
only because the client has barred access to important information or 
has otherwise refused to cooperate, but also because of conditions 
beyond the control of the client or investigator (“external limita-
tions”).  For example, a material witness may be deceased, unavaila-
ble for health reasons, or uncooperative; critical documents may have 
 
 184 See supra Part III.D. 
 185 See supra Part III.C.   
 186 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the nature of the client and third party reliance 
on the report).   
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been lost prior to the investigation; or the exigency of the report may 
limit the extent of the inquiry.  The client may wish counsel to pro-
ceed nonetheless, since the client’s various motives for commission-
ing an internal investigation are generally unrelated to the presence 
or absence of external limitations.
187
  Investigative counsel may be 
more willing to conduct an investigation when the material limita-
tions are external rather than client-imposed because the difficulties 
are legitimate rather than contrived and a report, despite such limita-
tions, may be as close to the truth as practical. 
Nevertheless, while external limitations are not the result of 
client manipulation, they do not excuse counsel from exercising pro-
fessional judgment to assess their effect on the reliability of the inves-
tigation.
188
  In the face of external limitations, investigative counsel 
should disclose the material qualifications; determine whether they 
allow or preclude findings and conclusions, or warrant a reduced-
confidence standard; and, in any event, explain their effect on relia-
bility.  The report recipient presumably will be more tolerant of ex-
ternal limitations because the investigator’s attempt to find the truth 
may be the best account possible in trying circumstances. 
E. Transparency 
As we have discussed, a critical component of the investigator’s 
role is the exercise of professional judgment in interpreting and ap-
plying the law.  Although professional judgment shapes and con-
strains the investigator’s interpretive efforts, the interpretive range of 
this standard allows room for disagreement.  In other words, investi-
gators, just like judges, can reach differing outcomes when con-
fronted with the same facts and legal standards, and differing inter-
pretations can both be legitimate in the sense that they are within the 
canons of professional interpretation.
189
  All of this should pose troub-
ling questions for the recipient of the investigative report.  Except in 
the most obvious and determinate legal circumstances, the investiga-
tor’s conclusions likely require interpretation and application of legal 
standards that cannot purport to be definitive.  Moreover, while fact-
 
 187 See generally supra Part II (identifying and categorizing client motives for com-
missioning an internal investigation).   
 188 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 4 (2007). 
 189 See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.  In fact, Owen Fiss contends 
that a decision that is within the boundaries of professional judgment can still be 
wrong even though it is not illegitimate.  Fiss, supra note 117, at 748 (“Just as objectiv-
ity is compatible with a measure of disagreement, it should also be stressed that ob-
jectivity is compatible with error: [a]n objective interpretation is not necessarily a 
correct one.”).   
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finding is constrained by the investigator’s commitment to accuracy 
and the application of the truth standards, it also has an interpretive 
and professional-judgment component.
190
  Thus, even if the report 
recipient can safely presume that the investigator has exercised sound 
professional judgment, why should she accept the investigator’s con-
clusions? 
The answer, put bluntly, is that the reader should not rely on the 
investigator’s conclusions alone.191  The report recipient must ex-
amine the analysis and interpretation that gave rise to those conclu-
sions—not only to confirm that they are grounded in sound profes-
sional judgment, but also to determine whether the report recipient 
agrees with the investigator’s interpretive efforts.  The value of the 
investigative report lies not only in its commitment to the truth stan-
dards and professional judgment, but in its detailed explanation of 
the evidence, reasoning, and interpretation that gave rise to the con-
clusions.
192
 
For this reason, the investigator will devote considerable effort to 
developing a full account of the reasoning that underlies the report’s 
conclusions.  A report that offers only conclusions or only a cursory 
account of their basis is of minimal value to the report recipient.  A 
conclusory report asks the report recipient to accept the investiga-
tor’s interpretation at face value.  Why should a report recipient ac-
cede as much, when judges—who are not compensated by clients for 
their investigative efforts—regularly disagree about the meaning and 
application of the law? 
F. The Truth Standards and Negligence 
The truth standards developed herein are not grounded on tort 
principles; they derive from the accuracy commitment implied by the 
attorney-ethics rules in reliance investigations and by the duty of in-
quiry imposed on corporations in a variety of settings.
193
  Nonetheless, 
 
 190 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text; Part III.B.4.   
 191 In the case of an investigative report submitted to the client to satisfy a duty of 
inquiry, the board of directors or appropriate client entity is charged with forming 
conclusions and thus should not blindly accept the investigator’s findings and con-
clusions, but should instead reach its own conclusions based on the information pre-
sented.  See RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 82, at 496.   
 192 See Wendel, supra note 114, at 1190 (“In every serious account of legal interpre-
tation, the interpreter’s judgment must be transparent—that is, available for public 
observation and criticism.  Requiring the interpreter to justify her judgment to the 
public defends the judgment’s objectivity against the critique that the interpreter is 
simply imposing her own policy preferences on the law.”). 
 193 See supra Part III.A.1.   
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investigative counsel does owe a duty of care under negligence law to 
the client and the third party to whom she delivers a report.
194
  But 
the duty of care standard leaves critical questions unanswered.  First, 
what is the content of the duty?  Second, how can duties of care owed 
to a third party be squared with investigative counsel’s duty of care to 
the client?
195
 
The truth standards suggest answers to both questions.  They de-
scribe with some precision the duties of counsel who conduct duty 
and reliance investigations.  In a reliance investigation, they identify 
what the third-party recipient of the report has a right to expect and 
rely on: an investigation committed to developing an accurate ac-
count by adherence to the truth standards that further such goal.  
Likewise, a client who commissioned such an investigation to satisfy a 
Sarbanes-Oxley inquiry duty (or to satisfy management’s duty of care) 
should expect that each of the truth elements will be satisfied by 
counsel and that client can therefore rely upon the resulting investi-
gation to fulfill its own inquiry requirements. 
In addition, a central question in the reliance investigation is 
how the investigator’s duties to a third party can be squared with the 
investigator’s obligations to the corporate client who commissions, 
underwrites, and is the subject of the investigation.  Without refer-
ence to the truth standards, negligence law offers no principled basis 
for reconciling the duties of care to the client and the third party be-
cause it simply extends a general duty of care to both parties.
196
  The 
truth standards offer a clear conception of how to reconcile the com-
peting roles of investigative counsel that can answer such questions in 
the tort setting.  Investigative counsel cannot be held liable to the 
client or a third party for acts or omissions that are required by the 
truth standards, even though the report may disserve either party’s 
interests.
197
 
 
 194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. a (2000); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977) (identifying an exception not re-
levant here). 
 195 See generally Kevin H. Michels, Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A 
Proposed Unified Liability Standard, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143 (2009) (arguing that 
the principal limitation on attorney duties of care to third parties should be the at-
torney’s conflicting ethical obligations to clients and others). 
 196 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.   
 197 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54(1) (providing 
that duty of care does not require an attorney to perform any act in violation of an 
ethical duty).     
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IV. THE TRUTH STANDARDS APPLIED 
The next question is what the truth standards signify for practi-
tioners in the investigation setting.  We will examine each phase of 
the investigation process from retention to the investigation itself to 
reporting, asking how the truth standards and other insights offered 
in Part III shape the practice of counsel who conduct internal investi-
gations.
198
  The practice issues that follow are selective rather than 
exhaustive; the main objective is to refine an understanding of the 
truth standards through application. 
A. The Retention Structure 
When the corporation decides to undertake an internal investi-
gation, it retains counsel who will conduct the investigation.  By re-
tains or retention, we refer to the engagement agreement to under-
take an internal investigation between the corporation and counsel.
199
  
The investigating attorney serves as counsel to the corporation, not to 
any of the other stakeholders in the investigative outcome.
200
  The in-
vestigation often entails the collection and preservation of relevant 
documents and data; identification and interviewing of witnesses; de-
velopment of a factual and legal analysis; and an oral or written re-
port to the company, which explains what happened and its legal sig-
nificance.
201
 
The client who retains and compensates investigative counsel 
understandably expects a certain degree of control over the effort.  
Both client and counsel must therefore understand and agree on the 
nature of the counsel’s investigative role and the limits on the client’s 
control over the investigation.  The corporation and investigative 
counsel should expressly agree that counsel is charged with produc-
ing an accurate account in accordance with truth standards, and that 
 
 198 The analysis that follows presumes that the truth standards apply to the investi-
gation in question.  The truth standards apply to most investigations that are con-
ducted in response to material allegations of wrongdoing.  See supra Part II.B.     
 199 Although the Model Rules indicate that it is preferable to communicate the re-
tainer agreement in writing, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2007), cer-
tain states require a retainer agreement to be in writing.  See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.5(b) (2004); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.5(b) (2008); 
CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.5(b) (2007); N.J. RULES OF PROF’S CONDUCT R. 
1.5(b) (2009).  Given the importance and complexity of the undertaking, internal 
investigations should be conducted only pursuant to a written retainer agreement.   
 200 See MODEL RULES  OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a).   
 201 For an overview of the investigative process, see Duggin, supra note 2, at 890–
92; Collin P. Marks, Thompson/McNulty Memo Internal Investigations: Ethical Concerns of 
the “Deputized” Counsel, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1065, 1068–71 (2007).  
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the client will impose no limitations on counsel that will prevent her 
from fulfilling this objective.  Beyond this general understanding, 
counsel and client should be sensitive to an array of issues that arise 
in the retention stage, from assurance that conflicts of interest will 
not undermine the investigation to the grant of sufficient latitude to 
conduct an investigation that satisfies the sufficiency standard.  We 
will consider these issues next. 
1. The Biasing Interest 
Biasing interests are interests, incentives or obligations of inves-
tigative counsel that pose a substantial risk of materially diverting the 
investigator from providing an accurate account.
202
  Client compensa-
tion of the investigator, standing alone, does not present an interest 
that diverts investigative counsel from seeking an objective account in 
the way that other biasing interests discussed below may.
203
  When, 
however, the investigating attorney serves as counsel to the corpora-
tion in connection with matters other than the investigation, the at-
torney has a financial incentive to render a report that is not damag-
ing to the corporation, because a harmful report may result in the 
loss of future work on behalf of the client.
204
  In Enron, for example, 
the court rejected a motion to dismiss claims against the law firm that 
conducted the internal investigation, citing its receipt of over $100 
million in legal fees from Enron on other matters; the fact that Enron 
was the firm’s largest client, representing seven percent of the firm’s 
revenue; and the fact that, over the years, more than twenty of the 
firm’s attorneys left to join Enron’s in-house legal department.205 
 
 202 See supra Part III. 
 203 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (contemplating such compensa-
tion for an evaluation through use of the term “client”).  Likewise, in the client-
representation setting, the Model Rules expressly allow third-party payment of a 
client’s legal fees, provided inter alia that there is “no interference with the lawyer’s 
independence of professional judgment.”  Id. R. 1.8(f).  The analogy from the repre-
sentation to the investigation context is helpful, although the roles are in a sense re-
versed: the client can be understood as paying for the legal services involved in devel-
oping an accurate account for itself and the third-party recipient of the report, and the 
client’s payment for such services must not affect the professional judgment of the 
investigator.   
 204 See James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the 
Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2003) (noting 
that in the special litigation committee context “the committee’s counsel’s ability to 
retain future corporate business is dependent upon the decisions of the very execu-
tives the committee, through its counsel, is investigating”).   
 205 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 656–
57 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  For an example in the shareholder derivative setting, see In re 
Par Pharm., Inc. Derivative Litig., 750 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to 
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Another important question is whether the company’s in-house 
counsel can conduct an internal investigation.  The in-house attorney 
has even stronger financial ties to the corporation than longstanding 
outside counsel because the company is the source of her employ-
ment and salary.
206
  A report that finds the corporation or its man-
agement guilty of criminal or civil wrongdoing is not likely to en-
hance the employment prospects of the general counsel.  Another 
concern posed by such an arrangement is the prior relationship be-
tween management of the corporation and general counsel, which 
may add a personal element to an investigative role that is already 
fraught with the potential for conflict.
207
  Once again, as with all bias-
ing interests, general counsel may rise above these personal concerns 
and present an accurate account.  In-house counsel, for example, 
regularly advise their executives not to press forward with transactions 
despite the disfavor they may incur for such advice.  In fact, the ability 
to render honest, dispassionate advice, favor notwithstanding, likely 
ranks among the higher callings of inside counsel when advising the 
corporation.  One commentator argues that the decision regarding 
whether to use in-house counsel or special counsel is “far more 
nuanced than is often appreciated,” citing considerations that in-
clude access to corporate information and its relation to a corpora-
tion’s business, and attorney-client privilege and work product con-
cerns.
208
 
The bias element of the independence standard does not war-
rant a per se prohibition on an internal investigation by inside coun-
sel, except when the statute or court rules insist on such complete se-
paration.
209
  On balance, however, inside counsel faces a considerable 
 
dismiss action, citing special litigation committee’s failure to retain independent 
counsel).  For instances outside the investigation context in which a prior or ongoing 
relationship with the client has been questioned, see 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)(i)(A) 
(2002) (construing Investment Company Act of 1940, which requires approval of in-
dependent directors advised by independent counsel before undertaking certain 
transactions); Cox, supra note 204, at 1085 (arguing that counsel who advise inde-
pendent directors on whether to approve transactions that pose conflicts of interest 
for management should not have prior relationship with company).   
 206 See Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
955, 956, 967–68 (2005);    E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Ten-
sions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 11, nn.27–28 (2006).     
 207 See, e.g., Bennett v. Progressive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002);  Hill v. Children’s  Vill., 196 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
 208  Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corpo-
rate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1008 (2007).   
 209 The shareholder-derivative action, for example, requires outside counsel.  Da-
lrymple v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Traverse City, 615 F. Supp. 979, 986 (W.D. Mich. 
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burden in showing that the advantages of the experienced insider 
outweigh the bias concerns posed by inside counsel’s ongoing em-
ployment.  When corporate counsel advises the company not to go 
forward with a transaction despite the profit potential, it is often be-
cause she sees a more important long-term corporate interest—
liability or a regulatory concern, for example—at stake.  Thus, the 
candor that accompanies unpopular advice is typically consonant 
with the interests of the corporation.  By contrast, an investigative re-
port that concludes that the company or its senior management is 
guilty of civil or criminal wrongdoing portends material adverse con-
sequences to the company, which is sharply distinct from negative ad-
vice that will benefit the corporation in the long run.  Moreover, in-
side counsel need not personally conduct the internal investigation in 
order to share his business background, personnel, and contextual 
knowledge with investigative counsel.  With respect to witness access, 
the corporation can generally condition continued employment on 
cooperation with the investigation,
210
 a resource that should be at 
least as strong as friendship in encouraging cooperation.
211
  And final-
ly, as discussed earlier, we restrict material biasing interests not be-
cause they are guaranteed to skew the investigation but because the 
recipient of the report has no way to determine whether bias affected 
the outcome.
212
 
Another source of bias relating to the role of counsel concerns 
the risk that counsel will investigate issues on which the attorney pre-
 
1985) (“The role of the Special Litigation Committee is anomalous, as it involves an 
ostensibly independent investigation by directors of their colleagues’ and their own, 
misconduct, assisted by an attorney selected precisely because he had no previous 
professional relationship with either the corporate entity or its directors. Problems of 
conflicting loyalties in connection with previous transactions and advice given to the 
corporation and its managers do not, therefore, arise.”).  A Sarbanes-Oxley investiga-
tion should also be conducted by outside counsel.  Former SEC Commissioner Cyn-
thia A. Glassman has encouraged independence “in definition as well as spirit.”  
Glassman, supra note 66.   
 210 See Michael Waldman, Internal Investigations for Government Contractors, in 
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at 335, 406–07.   
 211 Moreover, if the witness’s longstanding relationship with inside counsel would 
prompt the witness to repose trust in counsel qua investigator, then counsel may be 
trading unfairly on such trust, given that investigative counsel represents only the 
corporation (and not the witness) and that the corporation may later decide to dis-
close the report notwithstanding its inculpation of the witness.  See Duggin, supra 
note 2, at 910–11; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2007) (requir-
ing a lawyer, when “dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, 
members, shareholders or other constituents,” to “explain the identity of the client 
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s interests 
are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing”).   
 212 See supra notes 131–41 and accompanying text.   
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viously had a counseling role.  The conflict here stems from the fact 
that the attorney has a personal interest in affirming the propriety of 
the act or omission on which she gave advice, given that a contrary 
assessment might expose her to a malpractice or third-party claim.  
The now archetypal example of this conflict is Enron, in which the law 
firm investigated the propriety of transactions that it earlier handled 
or for which it earlier acted as counsel.
213
   
2. The Advocacy Conflict 
The retention agreement should make clear that the investigator 
is not, in any sense, a client advocate and that the investigator has no 
obligation to protect or advance the interests of the client in connec-
tion with the investigation.  As discussed earlier, the defense of the 
corporation on charges related to the investigation poses a direct 
conflict with the investigative role, and thus the truth standards ban 
an investigating attorney from also acting as defense counsel in an ac-
tion related to the investigation.
214
 
Suppose that in addition to the investigative role, counsel is re-
tained to advise the corporation on whether and how to disclose the 
report to the government, and to assist the corporation in gaining the 
best possible outcome in a negotiation with the government. Here, 
the line separating the investigative and advocacy roles is dangerously 
blurred.  The investigator has a dual commitment: to develop an ac-
curate account for the third party and the corporation and to minim-
ize the company’s exposure with respect to the subject of the investi-
gation.  This tension can undermine the investigation.
215
 
When responding to allegations of wrongdoing, corporations 
have an incentive to identify evidence proving that the criminal 
 
 213 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 636–
37 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that investigative counsel “issued a whitewash report 
dismissing these detailed complaints of fraud even though the law firm knew the al-
legations were true because it was involved in structuring many of the manipulative 
devices”); see also Cramton, supra note 29, at 164–66 (2002) (noting conflict posed by 
investigative counsel’s investigation of transactions that counsel helped consum-
mate).  
 214 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt. c (1998).     
 215 Consider, for example, the mixed investigative and advocacy role described in 
Bennett, supra note 12, at 57 (2007).  The article examines investigations designed to 
“protect the interests of the corporation. . . .”  Id.  It later discusses whether and how 
the investigation results should be disclosed to the government to gain cooperation 
points and defuse potential criminal prosecution.  Id. at 80–84.  To the extent, how-
ever, that the investigation itself is shared with the government or another third par-
ty, the truth standards apply and prevent assumption of a corporate protection or 
defense role by investigative counsel.   
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wrongdoing was the isolated work of lower-level employees and was 
not orchestrated at the executive or policy level, because the latter 
will result in more severe corporate sanctions.
216
  Given the risks that 
the discovery and disclosure of such inculpatory information pose, 
the attorney who is charged with both conducting the investigation 
and with an advocacy role with respect to its disclosure may face con-
flicting incentives when the investigation suggests management-level 
wrongdoing.  How energetically will investigative counsel, who is also 
charged with advancing the corporation’s interests, pursue and de-
velop inculpatory evidence when the results of that investigation may 
expose the corporation to grave economic and criminal conse-
quences?  A vigorous, company-sponsored search for facts and infor-
mation showing management-level complicity or reckless indifference 
in such criminal wrongdoing is hardly the self-evident first step in 
protecting the corporation’s interests.  Even more delicate questions 
would surround investigative counsel’s characterization of the facts in 
the investigative report if the investigator also assumed such an advo-
cacy role.  Therefore, investigative counsel should make clear in the 
retention agreement that she will not assist in seeking to optimize the 
outcome for the corporation in its dealings with third parties with re-
spect to the investigation issues, even though the investigation and 
advocacy roles are separated temporally.
217
  This is one reason why it 
is critical to identify which investigations are subject to truth stan-
dards; in a reliance or duty investigation (as distinct from a counsel-
ing investigation), this advocacy role is simply unacceptable.
218
 
 
 216  All too often legal and social responsibility and blame is attributed to 
individuals, often relatively junior individuals, who may have been the 
immediate cause of a corporate misdemeanours [sic], rather than at-
tention and responsibility being attributed to the structural and system-
ic problems which may have given rise to or allowed the problem to 
emerge.   
Bridget M. Hutter, Structure Model: Reforming Regulation, in DEBATING CORPORATE 
CRIME 208 (W.S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997); see also Laufer, supra note 7, at 658–59 
(discussing the dangers of scapegoating lower-level employees).   
 217  In addition, investigative counsel should not later represent the client with re-
spect to issues relating to the investigation in a civil or criminal matter.  
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 82, at 496.   
 218 Professor Duggin argues that in order to fulfill his ethical duty to the corpora-
tion, an investigator must search for and develop evidence of lower-level wrong-
doing, since the latter will minimize the corporation’s culpability.  Duggin, supra 
note 2, at 910.  Although it is one of the finest pieces of scholarship to date on inter-
nal corporate investigations, the article, like most others, does not seek to identify 
which investigations are subject to truth standards or what those truth standards en-
tail.  Id. passim.  It is a central claim of this Article that in a reliance or truth investiga-
tion it is avowedly not the obligation of counsel to protect the corporation’s interest.  
On the contrary, investigative counsel’s role is to develop an accurate account. 
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Investigative counsel should resist assuming all duties that blur 
the line between investigator and advocate.  Counsel charged with 
optimizing the outcome for the client are simply not in a position to 
develop an accurate assessment of the company’s wrongdoing.  Other 
advocacy conflicts can arise when counsel assumes, on behalf of the 
client,  a role related to the investigation that has the potential to un-
dermine the truth standards.  In Part IV.B, we will discuss how inves-
tigative counsel’s efforts to protect the attorney-client privilege dur-
ing the course of the investigation can affect the truth standards. 
3. The Sufficient-Inquiry Standard 
Counsel and client should also agree at the retention stage that 
counsel will have ample latitude and resources to conduct an investi-
gation that satisfies the sufficiency standard.  The client, of course, 
has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the cost of the investigation 
is reasonable.
219
  What is reasonable, however, is based on the time 
and resources necessary for counsel to conduct a sufficient inquiry as 
defined above.
220
  The corporation should agree to provide access to 
documents, employee witnesses and other sources within its control 
that will enable counsel to conduct a sufficient inquiry.  Additionally, 
the investigator can accept no client-expenditure or access limits that 
preclude sufficient inquiry. 
The sufficient-inquiry standard likewise requires agreement at 
the retention stage on the issues counsel will investigate.  At first 
blush, one might assume that the allegation of wrongdoing that trig-
gers the internal investigation would define the issues to be investi-
gated.  This presupposes, however, that the allegation is sufficiently 
crafted to identify such wrongdoing.  In fact, credible allegations can 
arise from current and former employees, customers, or others who 
may not have the legal background to understand or articulate the 
nature of the wrongdoing.  Moreover, the complainant may not be 
privy to the full extent of the wrongdoing and the allegation may 
identify only a small aspect of a larger problem. 
Despite these difficulties, counsel and the corporation should 
seek in the retention agreement to describe the problem to be inves-
tigated with sufficient breadth to ensure that the investigator has the 
 
 219 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not 
make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 
amount for expenses.”). 
 220 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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authority to explore the issue in its entirety.
221
  Conversely, there is 
danger in describing the issue more expansively than the parties in-
tend because the commitment to accuracy precludes counsel from 
delivering an investigative report that explores less than the issue it 
purports to examine.  Of equal importance, the retention agreement 
should establish a procedure whereby counsel can expand the scope 
of inquiry during the course of the investigation, should it be war-
ranted.
222
 
B. Conducting the Investigation 
In this Part, we will consider two questions that require the close 
attention of counsel during the course of an investigation.  The first 
concerns a question that often cannot be fully answered until after 
the investigation is underway: what issue will counsel investigate?  The 
second concerns the delicate handling of privilege questions during 
the course of the investigation. 
1. Scope and Depth 
The factual component of the investigation might be parsed into 
two categories: “scope” and “depth.”  “Scope” might be visualized as 
a horizontal line representing the range of factual events and issues 
that counsel will explore.  “Depth” might be represented by a vertical 
line, representing the extent of the inquiry on any given fact question 
or issue.  The accurate account and sufficient-inquiry standards re-
quire counsel to keep a close watch on each of these two aspects of 
the factual inquiry. 
With respect to scope, counsel may discover during the investi-
gation that the alleged problem is just one instance of a larger array 
of wrongdoing.  Counsel must then explore with the client whether 
the scope of the investigation should be expanded to reflect that dis-
covery.  The client may have mixed feelings about such an expansion.  
The client may be concerned about increasing the expense and in-
trusiveness of the investigation and the corporation’s exposure.  Nev-
ertheless, the client should also understand that ignoring internal 
wrongdoing may present graver risks. 
 
 221 For examples in the shareholder derivative setting, see Electra Inv. Trust PLC 
v. Crews, No. 15890, 1999 WL 135239 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 1999) (requiring thorough 
investigation); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000–03 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing 
the insufficiency of limited or pro forma investigations).   
 222 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing scope changes during the course of the investi-
gation).   
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Investigative counsel faces a different set of concerns.  First, 
counsel should not  advise a company as to how a change in scope 
could affect its culpability because such an advisory role conflicts with 
the attorney’s investigative role.223  The attorney, however, is not in-
different about whether to expand the scope of the investigation be-
cause the question bears directly on whether the investigation will sa-
tisfy the truth standards.  Under the sufficient-inquiry standard, the 
attorney must inquire into the facts of the allegation until additional 
investigation no longer presents a genuine prospect of gaining in-
formation that will materially affect his findings on the issue in ques-
tion.
224
  If that issue involves more departments and personnel than 
originally anticipated, or if the wrongdoing is part of a scheme that 
extends more broadly than expected, then the scope of the investiga-
tion must be expanded so that the issue can be sufficiently investi-
gated and accurately reported.  In a sense, the scope of the investiga-
tion is an ongoing question; sufficiency is in part a function of what is 
learned during the investigation about the range of involvement.
225
  If 
the client refuses to expand the scope of the investigation when the 
sufficiency standard demands such an expansion, then investigative 
counsel cannot deliver a report consistent with the truth standards. 
The depth of the investigation implicates the evidentiary-
reliability standard.  The case law and ethics opinions that consider 
opinion letters offer important insight as to what is required of the 
attorney.
226
  The attorney may not rely on statements of company offi-
cials if the information “appears irregular on its face or has been pro-
vided by an inappropriate source.”227  One ABA opinion identifies an 
array of reasons to look beyond an officer’s assertion, stating, “If any 
 
 223 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.     
 224 See supra Part III.B.2.   
 225 A retention letter could allow counsel to expand the scope of the investigation 
on her own initiative, as necessary to ensure compliance with the truth standards.  If 
the client prefers to be consulted prior to expansion of the scope, however, counsel 
can agree to do so, subject to the truth standards.  Counsel cannot deliver a report if 
a client-imposed limitation on the scope precludes a sufficient investigation of the 
issue addressed.  Pursuant to Rule 1.16(a)(3) of the Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, the 
client has an unfettered right to terminate the investigative effort whenever it wishes, 
which is the client’s principal protection if it perceives that the investigator is abusing 
his discretion or that the investigation is too costly.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3) (2007).   
 226 As noted earlier, opinion letters pose fewer concerns about reliability than in-
ternal investigations.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  Opinion letters do 
pose an attenuated version of the question at issue here, however: can investigative 
counsel rely on the statements of executives without inquiring further?     
 227 ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Legal Opinion Principles, 53 BUS. LAW. 831, 833 
(1998).   
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of the alleged facts, or the alleged facts taken as a whole, are incom-
plete in a material respect; or are suspect; or are inconsistent; or ei-
ther on their face or on the basis of other known facts are open to 
question, the lawyer should make further inquiry.”228  A source of sus-
picion prompting an opinion giver to inquire may be the client’s “re-
luctance to disclose information.”229  When the lawyer asked to deliver 
an opinion concludes, despite the need for further inquiry, that such 
investigation will not give him “sufficient confidence as to all the re-
levant facts,” he should not deliver the opinion.230 
These principles apply with greater force in the internal investi-
gation setting.  Because the allegations of corporate wrongdoing in 
the internal investigation context often pose substantial criminal and 
civil risks for the company, there is reason for concern that at least 
some of the actors in the corporation will be less than forthcoming.  
In the opinion context, the corporate employee will have fewer rea-
sons to dissemble because the representations in the opinion letter 
provide assurances to consummate a transaction rather than an as-
sessment of an allegation of wrongdoing.  The internal investigation 
is truth seeking unlike any other in the American justice system.  It is 
avowedly not adversarial.  Truth does not emerge from the clash of 
positions, but from the unilateral inquiry of counsel.  The investiga-
tor must, for example, consider witness demeanor, credibility, and 
candor; press witnesses in light of other contradictory testimony or 
documentation; determine when and whether to dig deeper with a 
particular witness; determine whether to search for other witnesses 
who can fill in gaps, reveal inconsistencies, affirm the testimony of 
others; and so on.
231
 
2. Privilege 
Investigative counsel may be asked to investigate the corporation 
and to take steps to ensure that the corporation’s attorney-client pri-
 
 228 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974).   
 229 Id.   
 230 Id.   
 231 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
668 n.103 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (quoting Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Law-
yer: Professional Responsibility Issues, 1324 PLI/CORP. 841, 854 (2002), reprinted in Cram-
ton, supra note 29, at 164).  The decision quoted Professor Crampton’s criticism of 
the investigation for interviewing “only seven high-level officials, most of whom were 
directly implicated in the self-dealing and fiduciary violations raised by the Watkins 
allegations.”  Id.  The investigator relied on the denials of these officials and did not 
interview nine other, lower-ranking employees whom one of the high-level officials 
identified as “good sources of information concerning Fastow’s self-dealing.”  Id. 
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vilege and work-product protections are maximized.
232
  By preserving 
the attorney-client privilege in the investigation, the company hedges 
its bets; the decision to disclose can be made after the investigation is 
complete, with the added benefit of knowing what independent 
counsel has discovered.  On the one hand, an investigator’s privilege 
maintenance does not imply a client commitment with respect to the 
outcome of the investigation.  Therefore, counsel’s efforts to protect 
the privilege are not inherently inconsistent with her accuracy obliga-
tion; in fact, an accurate account is the central rationale for providing 
corporations privilege protection in the investigation results.  Corpo-
rations are more likely to undertake a free and open investigation in-
to wrongdoing if they can maintain the results in confidence.
233
 
Nonetheless, investigative counsel cannot allow efforts to protect 
the privilege to compromise her obligation to produce an accurate 
account.  Investigative counsel often conduct their investigations on 
the assumption that their report and notes will be disclosed to prose-
cutors and adversaries.
234
  Although the disclosure may be voluntary 
to serve the cooperation goals,
235
 the prospect of such discovery can 
affect the truth-seeking efforts of investigative counsel.  For example, 
some commentators advise investigative counsel to avoid taking ver-
batim transcripts of interviews during the investigation because pure-
ly factual recitations are more likely to be discoverable than memo-
randa summarizing interviews that contain “observations and 
opinions” of counsel. 236  An investigator who is concerned solely with 
developing the most accurate account of what happened may well 
prefer a verbatim transcript of her discussions with dozens of wit-
nesses rather than summaries laced with work product designed to 
 
 232  In a reliance investigation, counsel may seek to preserve the attorney-client 
privilege and preserve the option for the company to decide after completion of the 
investigation whether to disclose it to third parties.  See supra note 18.  In a duty inves-
tigation, the prospects of preserving the attorney-client privilege are reduced.  See su-
pra note 75. 
 233 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390–91 (1981).  
 234 Due to the frequency of waiver demands, investigative counsel often “begin 
their investigations knowing that everything they discover, every note they take, and 
every interview they conduct will be reviewed by the DOJ and federal prosecutors.”  
Marks, supra note 201, at 1079–80  (citation omitted).   
 235 See supra notes 47–57 and accompanying text.  The Justice Department typical-
ly views such disclosure as evidence of company cooperation, which can substantially 
influence its charging and resolution decisions. See McNulty Memorandum, supra 
note 52, at 10 (prosecutors “may always favorably consider a corporation’s acquies-
cence to the government’s waiver request”).   
 236 Shapiro, supra note 49, at 501.  The theory is that memoranda that are purely 
factual are less easily protected against discovery than those laced with attorney work 
product because the latter receives higher protection against discovery.   
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reduce its discoverability.  Moreover, investigative counsel sometimes 
recommend taking no notes during witness interviews because of the 
risk that the government or a future adversary may discover the mate-
rials.
237
  The procedure is unobjectionable but not easily reconciled 
with counsel’s obligation to develop an accurate, reliable account for 
a third party.
238
  For a profession that has long insisted on verbatim 
transcriptions of testimony in depositions and at trial, insisting on the 
absence of a written record is a striking departure in the truth-
seeking function of the investigation.
239
 
Privilege protection—like any ancillary client obligation under-
taken by investigative counsel—can have a subtle effect on investiga-
tive counsel’s role.  Will an attorney hired to conduct an investigation 
and to remain mindful of the risks posed by disclosure of its findings 
pursue inculpatory information with the vigor of one who carries no 
such privilege-protection burden?  The tension can be reconciled on-
ly if counsel stays vigilantly attuned to the investigation priority of de-
veloping and delivering an accurate account. 
C. Reporting the Results 
Assuming that counsel has delivered a report to the client that 
satisfies the truth standards, the next issues concern disclosure of the 
report to third parties.  As a general matter, the client has no obliga-
tion to release the investigative report to third parties and may with-
hold its decision on whether to do so until after it has received and 
considered the investigative report.  Investigative counsel generally 
may not deliver the report to anyone other than the client without 
the client’s consent.240 
If the corporation directs investigative counsel to deliver the in-
vestigative report to the government, the shareholders, the public, a 
court, or some other third party, then the investigation and report 
must satisfy the truth standards or address their absence through the 
 
 237 Turk & Miller, supra note 155, at 108 n.7. 
 238 In fact, Turk and Miller acknowledge that reflecting a witness’s observations as 
accurately as possible while maintaining work-product protection in the memoran-
dum “often involves two occasionally conflicting goals.”  Id. at 109.  
 239 See id. at 102–03 (stating that while a transcript is “likely to reflect the witness’s 
statement more accurately than a memo would,” it “would not be entitled to any 
work product protection”). 
 240 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(b) (2007) (requiring client con-
sent before disclosure of an evaluation that is likely to materially and adversely affect 
the client’s interests to a third party).   
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appropriate combination of qualifications, explanation, or a reduced-
confidence standard.
241
 
The corporate client may wish to release the results of the report 
to the public but not disclose the detailed findings contained in the 
report due to privilege, self-incrimination, management, or other 
reasons.  If the client asks counsel to disclose less than the entire re-
port, 
242
 counsel must act to ensure that the information released fair-
ly and accurately describes the outcome.  For example, if the sum-
mary states that the investigation found no company wrongdoing, 
and that statement is only qualifiedly correct, then counsel must in-
struct the client to include such qualifiers or withhold the summary. 
In a reliance investigation, counsel owes duties to the third-party 
recipient of the report.
243
  As a result, the client’s desire to control the 
flow of information cannot undermine counsel’s obligations under 
the truth standards.  The client can choose whether to release the re-
port, but it cannot manipulate the contents of the information dis-
closed if the information is to be portrayed as the finding of investiga-
tive counsel.  Therefore, counsel and the client may be best served by 
an agreement at the time of retention on how report disclosure will 
be handled.  For example, the agreement might state that the client 
reserves the right to determine whether the report should be released 
to a third party but that investigative counsel shall have no obligation 
to release the report unless it is complete or is a counsel-approved 
summary.
244
  Moreover, the agreement could provide that the client 
will not release any information that it characterizes as the product of 
an internal corporate investigation unless the entire report or a 
 
 241 See supra Part III.D.  
 242 Fundamental questions attend any effort to summarize an investigative report.  
Given the range of discretion involved in developing an account, the value of the re-
port ultimately is not its conclusions alone but is instead the care and accuracy with 
which the facts and legal standards are determined, the extent to which they are 
supported by the evidence, and the quality of the reasoning on which the conclu-
sions are based—all of which are exhibited in the investigative report and not the 
conclusions.  While a summary is not inherently deceptive, recipients of such short-
hand accounts can hardly be expected to treat the report with the same respect as a 
full account.  See supra Part III.E (arguing that results alone are of minimal reliance 
value to the report recipient).  Although clients would no doubt resist, a report 
summary could contain a warning of the dangers of reliance on investigation conclu-
sions without an understanding of the professional judgment and analysis on which 
it is based. 
 243 See supra Parts II.A.3.a, III.A.1. 
 244 Counsel should approve a summary only if it accurately portrays the findings, 
both affirmative and adverse, and contains the appropriate reliability qualifications. 
Likewise, recipients of such summary should ask whether it has been approved by 
investigative counsel who conducted the investigation.   
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counsel-approved summary is released.  The client could, however, be 
granted the right to release information from the report provided 
that such information is not characterized as the result of an internal 
corporate investigation. 
The corporation may direct investigative counsel to provide it 
with only an oral report.
245
  While this is certainly not objectionable 
for the client’s internal use, it sharply restricts the prospects of disclo-
sure of the investigative report to third parties.  An oral report likely 
cannot sufficiently capture the nuances and limitations to constitute 
an accurate account when delivered to a third party.  Perhaps the 
best way to ensure compliance with the truth standards is to provide 
recipients of an oral summary with access to the report itself or a writ-
ten summary that has been approved by investigative counsel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We began this inquiry by identifying the unanswered questions 
or suspect assumptions about the investigative enterprise that have 
prevented commentators and courts from developing a systematic 
understanding of the truth commitment entailed in the internal in-
vestigation.  By way of conclusion, we will revisit these issues. 
At their core, the first three questions ask whether there is a 
principled way to distinguish those investigations that are subject to 
special truth standards.  The taxonomy in Part II identifies two types 
of investigations that require imposition of special truth standards: 
the reliance investigation and the duty investigation.  In the reliance 
investigation, which implicates the attorney-ethics rules, the investiga-
tor makes claims about the provenance of the information disclosed 
to a third party.  The second category of investigation that warrants 
special truth standards is the duty investigation, in which the internal 
investigation is used to fulfill inquiry duties under the duty of care or 
a statutory-investigation requirement, such as Sarbanes-Oxley.  More-
over, corporations may be best served by insisting on compliance with 
the truth standards even in investigations that are not for delivery to a 
third party or that are conducted to satisfy corporate duties of in-
quiry. 
The next questions are what truth standards should be imposed 
on reliance and duty investigations and whether truth standards are 
even viable given the degree of judgment involved in conducting and 
reporting on an internal investigation.  The substantive-truth com-
 
 245 Edwin G. Schallert & Natalie R. Williams, Report of the Investigation, in INTERNAL 
CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 12, at 301, 303–04. 
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mitment that attaches to both the reliance and duty investigation is 
accuracy.  The third party in the reliance investigation and the corpo-
ration in the duty investigation rely on the investigative report be-
cause of its implied commitment to an accurate account.  The inves-
tigative role is therefore distinguished principally by its commitment 
to the truth.  The investigator does not communicate as a client rep-
resentative, spokesperson, or advocate, nor does she offer opinion or 
conjecture; instead, she engages in fact-finding, legal research, and 
analysis designed to provide as nearly as practicable an accurate ac-
count of the facts, the legal standards, and conclusions of law. 
The investigative goal of accuracy raises important questions 
about the objectivity of the law, facts, and their application in an in-
ternal investigation.  Do these elements admit of accuracy in an ob-
jective sense, and how can the seemingly quixotic goal of accuracy be 
translated into a workable standard?  The facts in an investigation 
approach the ideal of “strong” objectivity: they exist independently of 
the investigator’s mind and of what anyone else believes about them.  
Law and its application are best understood as objective in the mi-
nimal sense; they exist independently of the investigator’s mind, but 
they are constrained by the interpretive norms, standards, and prin-
ciples of the legal community.  While the opinion of the legal com-
munity may not be right in some ultimate sense, it is objective in the 
sense that it is both bounded and not based on the investigator’s state 
of mind.  For these reasons, the elements of an internal investigation 
are sufficiently objective for accuracy—properly understood—to serve 
as the goal of an investigation.  In turn, the goal of accuracy warrants 
adherence to procedural standards that will enhance the prospects of 
an accurate account. 
In Part III, we identified and described the four procedural ele-
ments—independence, sufficient inquiry, evidentiary reliability, and 
professional judgment—which substantially enhance the prospects of 
an accurate account when satisfied.  Independence requires the 
avoidance of advocacy conflicts, which are client-advocacy functions 
relating to the conduct and report of the investigation, and biasing 
interests, which are interests, incentives, or obligations of investigative 
counsel that present a substantial risk of materially diverting the in-
vestigator from providing an accurate account.  Despite the emphasis 
of lawmakers and courts, independence alone is not enough; it is on-
ly one of the procedural-truth standards that serve the core substan-
tive standard of accuracy. 
The sufficient-inquiry standard requires that counsel inquire in-
to the facts of the allegation until additional investigation no longer 
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presents a genuine prospect of gaining information that will material-
ly affect the findings.  The investigator must also conduct sufficient 
research to determine the legal standards implicated by the factual 
findings.  The third standard, evidentiary reliability, requires that the 
investigator address the special concerns regarding the reliability of 
evidence that flow from the absence of adversarial or judicial checks 
on the investigative process.  Under the final standard, professional 
judgment, counsel must interpret legal rules and standards in accor-
dance with the norms, standards, and procedures accepted by the le-
gal community.  The call for professional judgment extends to inter-
pretation of the other truth standards as well, which must be 
construed and applied in light of their principal purpose—to en-
hance the reliability of the investigation. 
The truth standards and their rationale present a number of ad-
ditional implications for the investigative enterprise.  Although they 
cannot guarantee a correct outcome, the truth standards warrant im-
position of a confidence standard resembling that applied to experts 
generally: the investigator must report results to a reasonable degree 
of professional certainty.  When the truth standards are not satisfied, 
however, juxtaposing conclusions with qualifications is not enough.  
Instead, the investigator must determine whether conclusions are 
possible in light of the deficiencies, identify a standard that reflects 
the confidence one should have in the conclusions in light of the qu-
alifications, and explain the effect on the qualifications of the investi-
gation outcome. 
The truth standards have two other important implications.  
First, the professional judgment required of the investigator, though 
it guides and constrains the investigator, leaves considerable room for 
interpretation and for disagreement within its legitimate boundaries.  
Therefore, the report recipient should be unwilling to rely on an in-
vestigative report that does not provide a detailed explanation of the 
evidence, analysis, and interpretation that gave rise to the outcomes.  
Second, the truth standards and related insights have important im-
plications for the tort obligations of investigators because they inform 
the standard of reasonable care by detailing the investigator’s obliga-
tions and their relation to client duties. 
In application, as Part IV discussed, the truth standards shape 
and guide the role of the investigator.  First, they allow investigators 
and clients to determine with some precision whether the investiga-
tion must or should be conducted in accordance with the truth stan-
dards.  Second, the truth standards enable the investigator and client 
to identify their respective obligations in advance of the investigation 
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and to design retention agreements to memorialize these commit-
ments.  Third, the truth standards will provide investigators with a 
deeper understanding of the nature and rationale of the truth com-
mitment that their investigative effort entails, as well as a roadmap for 
conducting and reporting the investigation.  This includes conflicts 
related to the investigator’s own role, the scope and depth of their 
investigative duties, the adoption of methods to test the reliability of 
witness statements, and explanations to the report recipient of ma-
terial concerns that affect accuracy.  The truth standards also identify 
investigator commitments that can undermine the reliability of the 
investigation, which include acceptance of client-imposed scope and 
depth-of-inquiry limitations, privilege-protection efforts that can un-
dermine reliability, the dangers of counseling the client on whether 
and how to share the investigation with third parties, and concerns 
about the release to third parties of information that inadequately 
summarizes the findings of the investigation. 
The most valuable contribution of the truth standards lies else-
where, however.  Government officials, courts, shareholders, the pub-
lic, and the corporation rely on investigative reports in assessing alle-
gations of material wrongdoing against the corporation—matters of 
unquestioned importance to the corporation, its stakeholders, and 
society.  The truth standards enhance the prospect that those who re-
ceive and rely on investigative reports will receive an accurate ac-
count.  The stakes are too high to accept anything less. 
 
